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ABSTRACT
In recent years, governments in South America have turned to large-scale hydropower as a
cost-effective way to improve livelihoods while addressing the energy 'trilemma': ensuring
that future energy technologies provide effective solutions to climate change, environmental
degradation, and security of supply. This work explores the rapidly-changing context for
hydropower in South America by looking at three flagship projects: Ecuador's Coca-Codo-
Sinclair (1,500MW), Chile's HidroAysen (2,750MW), and PerO's Inambari (2,000MW). Based on
three months of fieldwork interviewing key actors in these countries, this thesis makes three
primary claims. First, large-scale hydropower projects are evaluated against a small universe
of alternatives. These three sample projects are considered not as the best option among a
set of potential plants, but rather with respect to its possible iterations vis- -vis a specific
political goal, such as security and sovereignty, fast GDP growth, or regional integration. This
approach has resulted in considerable social and environmental conflict. Second, state
mediation of conflict has been further complicated by the presence of new sources of
financing for large infrastructure development-what the thesis refers to as "south-south
development ventures," through which national governments spearhead domestic
infrastructure development that does not rely on 'traditional'financing sources from
multilateral organizations. The prominence of these money sources denotes a clear historical
departure away from universal standards and toward bilateral management of decision-
making processes. Third, Ecuador, Chile, and PerO illustrate the overlap of diverse ecosystems
and settlements on and around hydropower sites. Regardless of the regulatory framework
governing energy planning in the case countries-it ranges from highly centralized in
Ecuador to completely liberalized and market-based in Chile-the state has found makeshift
regulatory or judicial solutions for this overlap. Large emblematic projects such as Coca-Codo-
Sinclair and HidroAysen have the potential to turn these state responses into landmark
decisions about future projects and the territories around them. Public opposition resulting
from this overlap reveals clear inadequacies in the way these countries plan and develop
high-interest infrastructure projects. The implication is that opportunities exist to make
hydropower a credible option to meet the energy trilemma if state actors are willing to think
beyond the "decide-announce-defend" model of decision-making and if South American
countries can set up a regional, independent, third-party oversight body to mediate between
the state, project sponsors, and civil society actors.
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Introduction
Hydropower Projects in South America: Why Now?
"Latin America is a beggar sitting on a bag of gold"
Attributed to Alexander Von Humboldt (1769-1859)
In 1987, government and civil society experts from 21 countries released the Brundtland
Report, a landmark publication that outlined the three pillars of sustainable development:
economic growth, environmental protection, and social equity. These pillars have remained
even as our understanding of the ways to best to improve the quality of life of present and
future generations have transformed over and over. These changes have occurred particularly
in response to the overwhelming evidence of global warming and its potential impacts
around the world. Today, a significant portion of the greenhouse gas emissions that
contribute to climate change comes from the energy sector, necessary to fuel economic
activity: 73% of total emissions in 2005, followed by 17% from agriculture. (EPA, 2012)
Echoing the Brundtland report and taking specific aim at the energy sector and its role in the
improvement of livelihoods, organizations like the International Energy Agency (IEA) have
defined the challenges ahead as a 'trilemma:' ensuring that future energy technologies
provide effective solutions to climate change, environmental degradation, and security of
supply.
In the context of South America, the tradeoff between development and environmental and
social degradation is especially stark. Governments in the region give precedence to the
betterment of livelihoods over both over environmental conservation goals and the rights of
those who live around plant sites, oft-vulnerable indigenous communities who may hold
special collective property rights over contested territories. The energy sector continually
prioritizes cost-effective, readily available resources for power generation, many of which
carry potentially negative impacts, such as the discharge of greenhouse gases into the
10
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atmosphere, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Since the discovery in the mid-XX
century of abundant reserves of oil and natural gas, governments have capitalized on fossil-
fired power generation to fuel economic growth. However, reserves have steadily decreased,
fuel prices have increased, and the effects of climate change have resulted in tangible costs
that no longer make fossil-fired power ideal. Governments in water-rich countries have
instead turned their attention to a tried and true technology for electricity generation:
hydropower, an often cheaper and arguably less-pollutant alternative. Reliance on local water
resources for power generation reduces reliance on imported fossil fuels, thus addressing the
IEA's call for security of supply. However, hydropower impacts the diverse social and natural
South American territories that house it, such as the Amazon region, and remains a deeply
controversial technology.
The context for hydropower in South America is rapidly transforming. In recent years, energy
authorities in the region-ministries, utility companies, planning agencies-have shown
exceptional speed in the approval of large-scale hydropower. This expediency obscures the
politically-charged history of this type of project. Beginning in the 1960s, the ruling military
dictatorships first embarked on 'energy accounting' enterprises to quantify hydroelectric
inventories in their sovereign territories. These efforts mark the first wave of large
hydropower construction, billed first and foremost as a way to bring about economic
development. Decades later, countries such as Colombia, Chile, Pero, and Brazil have begun
to develop the largest undeveloped potential hydropower sites. Today, governments not
only speak of hydropower's potential to catalyze economic development, the same potential
first recognized in the 1960s and 70s, but also loudly call for locally-sourced electricity
supplies, i.e., a call for energy sovereignty, as well as the need to minimize energy-based
carbon emissions.
Can governments effectively meet these goals without considerable social and
environmental impacts, or is this a Promethean pursuit? If there is an unavoidable tradeoff,
how can states in the region mediate between conflicting interests and goals? This thesis
explores the appropriate role of the state in the development of hydropower as a rejoinder to
I1I
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current debates in South America. The research focuses specifically on projects currently in
development in Ecuador, Chile, and Pero. Each of these three country cases is emblematic of
the trend toward hydro-based electricity systems; a regional comparison is crucial to
understand the political and institutional processes, specific to each country, that enable
and/or hinder hydro projects within the context of the 'trilemma.'
Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the energy sector in each of these three countries, a
contextualization necessary to understand the political and regulatory environments in which
governments make decisions about the future supply of energy. In spite of the differences
that exist across the three case countries, there are clear commonalities, such as a marked
underinvestment in large hydropower projects and a 'carbonization' of the countries'
generation portfolios over the last two decades. Chapter 2 will explore the largest
hydropower endeavor in Ecuadorian history, Coca-Codo-Sinclair (CCS), which has 1,500
megawatts (MW) of installed capacity for electricity generation and a total cost of $1.9 billion.
Blueprints for a dam on the Coca river basin were drawn up in the 1970s and have survived
three decades of political and economic change. The push and pull for CCS is intimately
connected to the political history of the country: in the 1970s, Ecuadorian economic policy
favored state-led, infrastructure-heavy development; in the late 1980s and 1990s, it
transitioned to far-sweeping privatization of government enterprises and diminishing of the
state's participation in the energy sector; finally, in the last half decade, economic policy has
come back to centralized, government-driven growth. CCS and other hydroelectric projects
alternatively gained prominence or appeared defunct alongside the transformation of
economic development policy.
It is tempting to conclude from Ecuador's case that state-driven energy planning is the main
enabler of large hydropower. However, experiences in the energy sectors in Pero and Chile
suggest otherwise. Inspired by Vinit Mukhija's "N of One plus Some: An Alternative Strategy
for Conducting Single Case Research," the thesis looks to Ecuador as a primary case. The
observations in Chapter 3 come from secondary examples from Chile's HidroAysen hydro
complex (2,750MW) and Pero's Inambari dam (2,000MW). This variation on case study
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methodology presents a complementary alternative to in-depth, single case research, which
often raises concerns about internal and external validity, "the ability to interpret causality
and the ability to generalize findings." (Mukhija, 2010) On the other hand, recognizing that
multiple case studies from all of South America imply a vast geographic, historic, and
disciplinary reach, this work limited the number of secondary cases to ensure enough in-
depth exploration of a single phenomenon.
This work will not be an argument explicitly for or against hydroelectricity. Rather than taking
a broad stance within this debate, the following pages flow from the self-evident premise that
not all projects are equally beneficial, and that the best way to assess and comprehensively
determine the potential benefits of hydropower is procedural, i.e., the set of criteria and
questions that must be addressed before projects can move forward. These processes cannot
be narrowly understood as universal safeguards or minimum standards, but rather as
processes closely bound to the development and planning priorities established in each
country, explicitly and implicitly. In other words, a commitment to large hydropower is
fundamentally a state-mediated political decision.
Making an honest decision about the role of large hydropower in future energy systems
necessitates a close examination of governmental means and mechanisms to resolve these
conflicts. In the examples included in this work, governments are either setting up new
mechanisms or ignoring the need for them; or else they are simply using new justifications to
legitimize whatever they decide to do. Ultimately, by highlighting recent regional trends in
the development of large hydropower, this thesis will provide a framework through which
states may analyze and solve potential conflict; that is, a set of key questions and common
issues to understand future projects.
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Three Key Regional Trends
The case of Ecuador points to three important trends associated with large hydro in Pert and
Chile, as well as other countries in South America, trends that are explained at length in
Chapter 3. First, emblematic projects such as CCS, as well as Pero's Inambari and Chile's
HidroAysen, are evaluated against a small universe of alternatives, limited not simply because
of water-resource availability or the cost of supply technologies and fuels, but also due to
political priorities. In other words, the hydro projects discussed in these pages are considered
not as the best alternative among a set of potential plants, but only with respect to its
possible iterations vis-n-vis a specific goal, such as security and sovereignty, fast GDP growth,
or regional integration. In each case, after a series of political and legal controversies, the
proposed generation capacity of each project changed over time, thus altering important
considerations such as minimum ecological flow numbers, flooded area, etc. Thus, to the
extent that these governments have carried out a kind of portfolio analysis, it has been
limited to the specific site and its surrounding areas-the affected river basin. After project
approval, transmission lines that have clear impacts beyond the dam site, become a fait
accompli, but nonetheless trigger separate political and legal conflicts. In this landscape,
hydropower projects are delayed but never forgotten; alternatives arise only when individual
projects fail as a result of conflict.
Second, state mediation of conflict has been further complicated by the presence of new
sources of financing for large infrastructure development. The construction of Ecuador's CCS
and PerG's Inambari embodies what the thesis refers to as "south-south development
ventures," through which national governments spearhead domestic infrastructure
development that does not rely on 'traditional'financing sources from multilateral
organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and other
development institutions that have otherwise sponsored infrastructure projects in these
countries.
14
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To minimize risk and facilitate conditions for hydropower development, over the last two
decades there have been a number of attempts to create universally applicable and reliable
standards for hydropower development. Between 1996 and the year 2000, the World
Commission of Dams developed a watershed report with an ambitious and comprehensive
set of guidelines for future dams. The report follows principles of public participation, social
equity, environmental sustainability, economic efficiency, and accountability. (WCD, 2000;
Scodanibbio & Mahez, 2005) Many critics have argued that the report made it effectively
impossible to develop fully compliant projects; some environmental groups victoriously
agree. (Briscoe, 2010; McCully, 2001) Also in 2000, the IEA issued a parallel report, focused
exclusively on hydropower and comparatively more industry-friendly. While the IEA's report
sets forth similar principles, it argues that national and local governments should take a direct
role in becoming arbiters and mediators of conflicts associated with dam development.
(Gagnon, Klimpt, & Seelos, 2002)
The WCD's framework has since been endorsed by a number of governments such as
Germany and private banks including HSBC and Dexia, and has been referenced in key trade
and economic cooperation agencies' documents, including the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Yet, not a single government involved in dam
building has made formal efforts to codify the reports' guidelines at the national level.
(Bosshard, 2010) The projects included in this thesis show that many of the WCD's
recommendations are not just difficult to implement, but simply overlooked. While the IEA's
recommendations justly call for fair state mediation, governments in Ecuador, Chile, and PerO
find it difficult to play the role of both project sponsors as well as monitoring and oversight
agencies, especially given the new financial and political context for large hydropower
development.
Today, the most visible global attempt to develop more industry-friendly norms and
standards comes from the International Hydropower Association (IHA), an industry trade
group composed of public utilities such as India's National Hydropower Corporation,
construction firms such as Brazil's Odebrecht, and large energy consumers such as Alcoa. In
15
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2008, the IHA convened the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum (HSAF) to develop
a new set of non-enforceable guidelines and principles. Members include international
environmental organizations like Oxfam and the Nature Conservancy, as well governments
like China, Brazil, Norway, and Iceland. It is still too soon to tell whether the HSAF's protocols
will improve megaproject development on the ground, especially given the speed of
approval of priority projects and the immediacy of well-coordinated public opposition in
countries like PerO and Chile.
The timidity of multi-lateral development agencies vis-A-vis large hydropower means that
today, substantial financial and technical support comes from other national institutions, such
as China's Import-Export Bank and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) in the case of
Ecuador and PerO, respectively; or, simply, from private actors with an interest in the long-
term delivery of energy, such a possible collusion of energy and mining companies in the case
of Chile. The prominence of these money sources denotes a clear historical departure away
from universal standards and toward bilateral management of decision-making processes. As
will be shown in Chapter 3, south-south development ventures open up new financing
options for megaprojects, sources that come with new, often untested or unclear procedural
rules and safeguards.
Third, Ecuador, Chile, and PerO all illustrate a condition easily found throughout South
America: the remarkable overlap of diverse ecosystems and settlements on and around
hydropower sites, each with their own distinct governance logic. Put simply, hydro projects
are located near or on areas officially designated for environmental conservation, and near or
on territories with special jurisdictional authority, such as indigenous lands. Regardless of the
regulatory framework governing energy planning in the case countries-it ranges from
highly centralized in Ecuador to completely liberalized and market-based in Chile-the state
and subsidiary energy and environmental authorities, as well as local governments, have no
alternative but to find regulatory solutions for this overlap, since there are often competing
territorial objectives. Large emblematic projects such as CCS and HidroAysen, by virtue of
their unprecedented scale, have the potential to turn these state responses into landmark
16
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decisions about future, similar projects, and the territories around them. Alternatively,
conflicts resulting from this overlap quickly reveal inadequacies in the way the state plans and
develops high-interest infrastructure projects. Large hydropower represents a territorial
contest; as Elden points out: "territory is more than merely land, and goes beyond terrain, but
is a rendering of the emergent concept of 'space' as a political category: owned, distributed,
mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled." (Elden, 2010: 810)
These issues point to the heart of the debate about hydropower in Ecuador, Chile, and Pero,
and the region as a whole: how does the state justify the country's need to grow its energy
production? And who is this energy for?
The Political Economy of Hydropower
Broadly speaking, large hydropower offers a clean, cheap, and reliable way to power
emerging economies. However, close analysis of specific projects and their relative size reveal
a much more complicated situation. Better to understand large hydropower, this section
provides an overview of how scale affects supposed benefits with respect to social and
environmental impacts, reliability of power supply, and the cost of energy generation.
Scale and Environmental and Social Impacts
There is hardly any disagreement among policymakers, industry, and civil society about the
potential of low-carbon power options to catalyze economic growth and curb emissions. This
is evident in the rapidly growing share renewables play in the supply of electricity around the
world: 20% in 2011. (REN21, 2011) However, the relatively higher cost of renewable
technologies, ranging from solar to wind to geothermal energy, has made it difficult for them
to grow without regulatory intervention. (Battle, Perez-Arriaga, & Zambrano-Barragsn, 2012)
Hydropower presents a typical case; even as it falls within the 'renewable' category, it is a
source of considerable controversy that merits active state involvement.
17
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The governance of water involves highly complex interactions between social actors, each
with different and often competing agendas and visions for the use and value of this
resource. Since the days of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)-established in the United
States in 1933 at a regional scale to deliver electricity, irrigation, and, ultimately, regional
economic development-water management has oscillated between "local watershed" and
"regional basin approaches," i.e., fairly localized approaches vs. larger-scale, regional
strategies, deployed to manage and conserve water. (Wescoat & Halvorson, 2012) Planning
for hydroelectricity presents a parallel problem. On the one hand, authorities and developers
have great enthusiasm for small-scale hydropower, given that it is generally (yet
questionably) considered to have few or no negative social and environmental impacts.
(Abbasi & Abbasi, 2011) Thus, it can more often be deployed without triggering major
regulatory hurdles or political opposition. Additionally, small hydro projects have fewer
transactional constraints-at a local level, it can be easier to resolve conflicts among a limited
set of stakeholders. On the other hand, large-scale projects, lauded for their ability to provide
electricity without producing waste or significant CO2 emissions, nonetheless require the
clearing of forests and displacement of people in order to dam rivers and create control
reservoirs for water flow. The impact on ecosystems and communities calls for a basin
approach and some level of governmental involvement, i.e., considerable regulatory and
political mediation at a regional level.
Indeed, there is a widespread, unchallenged convention in the public discourse about energy
that divides hydropower in two categories according to scale. Small hydropower is
considered a'renewable' technology, while larger projects merit a stand-alone grouping.
Virtually every energy ministry, electric system operator, and utility will report sectorial
statistics according to this classification. Regulation governing small hydro tends to be more
flexible in terms of environmental licensing approvals, water concessions, and economic
compensation-policies that reveal the popular assumption that small hydro carries fewer
impacts.
18
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Table 1. Upper limits of'small hydro' units set by various countries. From Abbasi&Abbasi (2011)
Country Limit (MW)
United Kingdom <5
Sweden <15
Colombia <20
Australia <20
Perd <20
Chile <20
India 25
China <25
Philippines <50
Ecuador <50
New Zealand <50
Energy authorities have an interest in classifying what constitutes small, yet there is no
comparable definition for large-scale hydro-it is usually a self-referential measure that
depends on the country's overall portfolio. Each of the cases demonstrates the degree to
which governments in Ecuador, Chile, and PerO consider large scale hydro to be the region's
best option simultaneously to curb electricity-based greenhouse gas emissions and to face
the potential impacts of climate change through flood and water level control, irrigation
systems, fish culture, among others. None of the case countries have binding targets for
emissions reductions, nor do they have strict local objectives within the energy sector; as will
be shown, with the exception of Chile, electricity generation accounts for a much smaller
portion of total emissions compared to agriculture.
From an economic perspective, carbon financing, through which international organization
grant resources to projects that reduce total emissions, do not factor into the decisions about
large hydropower, e.g., the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's clean
19
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development mechanism (CDM). This is due to the fact that these large-scale projects require
massive amounts of upfront capital investments; their financial feasibility does not depend on
clean development mechanism monies, a.k.a., the "additionality" test needed to obtain
approval for this type of financing. Nonetheless, there are clear economic benefits to the
displacement of fossil-fired power plants, which show considerable exposure to oil and gas
price volatility. The question is whether this incentive points in the right direction: will
electricity generators capture extraordinary profits from the production of costlier, fossil-fired
plants? Or can governments provide strong enough regulatory incentives to increase
efficiency and sustainability in the production and consumption of electricity, both in current
plants and in the construction of future generation? Moreover, rapid-growing demand for
cheap and reliable sources of electricity is a trend that favors large-scale energy projects that
rely on readily available feedstocks. These market dynamics can have direct effects on the
deployment of other, often costlier renewable energy technologies that are equally
important to achieve emissions reductions in the long-run.
Thus, the tendency to categorize hydro projects according to capacity size speaks not only to
considerations of governance or impacts on communities and the environment, but also to
the role large hydropower plays in energy systems. In South America, this type of plant
typically (though not exclusively) supplies 'baseload' energy, i.e., the minimum electricity
needs of a customer base, reliably and cheaply. Baseload plants have lower costs per unit of
output, and are thus expressly built to operate constantly, at the maximum production
possible. This introduces yet another dimension to 'scalar' questions: electricity portfolio
considerations, such as cost minimization and security of supply, which shed a different light
on large hydropower and its advantages relative to other sources of electricity.
Scale and Reliability
Key performance indicators for electricity generation include available energy-the power
that can be extracted, regardless of cost or location-and the technical potential of a
resource, or the amount of energy that can be extracted within the limits of current
technology, regardless of cost. South America is water-rich and hydropower is a proven
20
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technology; accordingly, some of the world's largest dam projects in the world are in South
America. The Itaipu project, on the Brazil-Paraguay border, has an installed capacity of
12,600MW and Guri, in Venezuela, enjoys 10,300MW. Consider that major nuclear and coal-
powered plants tend to have capacities below 1,000MW. The total available hydroelectric
reserves in South America is over 550 gigawatts (GW), yet, less than 25% of this potential has
been developed, compared to Europe's 65% and North America's 61 %. (OLADE, 2007; cited in
Berrizbeitia, 2009; lEA, 2000) From an availability perspective, hydropower is extremely
attractive for electricity generation.
A considerable portion of the region's hydroelectric resources lies in the Amazonian
watershed, extending from the Andes Mountains near the Pacific out west to Brazil's Atlantic
region. From the perspective of security of supply, this concentration presents challenges.
The capacity factor of a specific hydro plant-the actual electricity output over a period of
time divided by the total maximum possible output-depends to a great extent on rainfall
and seasonal precipitation patterns. For example, in the Amazon region, dry spells can easily
last for four to six months at a time, usually from November through March, reducing actual
production from a theoretical maximum to only half or two-thirds-a capacity factor ranging
from 0.5 to 0.7, and even lower on certain cases. Hydropower projects, especially those that
lack big reservoirs that accumulate and store water, may sometimes have considerably low
capacity factors. Thus, from a technical perspective, an optimal generation portfolio would
seek to complement baseload hydropower either with plants in regions with different
seasonal patterns (e.g., Brazil), or with thermal generation, which can be turned on (at higher
comparative costs) according to demand needs.
Scale and Cost
The cost of electricity, on a per unit basis, involves three main variables: operations and
maintenance, fuels costs, and capital costs. Renewable technologies have comparatively small
operation costs relative to fossil-fueled plants; with hydro, they are usually less than 5% of
total costs. Hydropower generates electricity when water drops gravitationally and powers a
turbine and generator. Though water is a limited resource (especially considering seasonal
21
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variations on rainfall that limit its availability), it bears no impact on expense, i.e., hydropower
has no fuel costs. The main driver of cost in hydroelectricity comes from the initial capital
investment, particularly in large-scale projects. Capital costs are site-sensitive and can thus
show great variability; according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), these range from
$1,750/kilowatt to $6,250/kW and have a global average of $4,000/kW. Altogether, these
three variables result in an overall average per unit of energy cost between $40 and
$110/megawatt hour (MWh). (IEA - ETSAP, 2010)
Cost-benefit concerns point to yet another way to think about scale in hydropower projects.
Large hydropower projects are expensive in terms of environmental and social externalities-
costs that bring us full circle to the 'scale and impacts' discussion. While there can positive
externalities, such as flood control or ecosystem services from artificial lake-reservoirs,
debates about large dams tend to focus on oft-underestimated negative impacts. These
externalities include cost overruns from social and environmental conflict, poor
environmental impact assessment and mitigation processes, and lack of post-project
accountability. Large-scale project tend to show "inadequate deliberation about risk and a
lack of accountability in the project decision-making process" (Flyvberg, Bruzelius, &
Rothengatter, 2003: 6) Opponents of large-scale dams argue that, since the Schoelkopf
hydroelectric plant first came online in 1881, there is now enough data to conclude that the
aggregate impacts of large-scale dams is negative on key accounts: poor generation
performance, poor rates of return on investment, considerable dam-induced displacement of
people, and irreversible changes to river basins and ecologies. (Duflo & Pande, 2005;
Goldsmith & Hildyard, 1984; McCully, 2001)
With respect to river ecosystems, one of the main impacts arises from the hold-up of
sediments behind dam walls. (SERVINDI, 2011) The through-flow contains little sediment,
which causes loss of habitat downstream through loss of seasonal islands and through
"scavenging of sediment form riverbeds downstream." (Jacobson, 2009:164) Meanwhile, dam
reservoirs flood areas suitable for land-base wildlife. Currently, however, rather than focusing
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solely on changes to river ecosystems, debates about the hydropower-based greenhouse gas
emissions have taken a prominent role in the debates about this technology.
When looking at renewable energy technologies, including hydropower, lifecycle emissions
analysis-an account of the total greenhouse gas emissions emitted throughout the plant's
entire life, from 'cradle-to-grave'-usually show that largest portion comes during
construction and manufacturing. Large dams have a useful life of 50 or more years, during
which few emissions are produced from operations; however, carbon and methane emissions
result from "microbial decay of dead organic matter under the water of a dam, particularly if
the reservoir was not logged before being filled. Such emissions are generally highest in
tropical areas and lowest in northern latitudes." (Jacobson, 2009: 155)
In Ecuador, Chile, and PerO alike, authorities argue that new hydropower projects will be of
critical importance to meet the any kind of emissions reduction goals. The way to account for
hydropower's contribution is to measure the avoided emissions following the displacement
of numerous fossil fuel plants. Critics point out that in many cases, projects not only grossly
underestimate emissions from large hydropower reservoirs, but also fail to consider that,
when seasonal patterns reduce the plants' capacity factor, there is an incentive to develop
new reservoirs and/or adjacent projects. (Pueyo & Fearnside, 2011)
Availability, reliability, sustainability-large hydropower invokes some of the key challenges
facing energy planning today.
The Link Between Energy and Development
It is important to note that a close evaluation of large hydropower is like putting the
proverbial cart before the horse. Countries like Ecuador, Per6, and Chile go through great
pains to build energy megaprojects because of the prevailing axiom in development
economics that sustaining growth depends on making parallel gains in energy production
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and consumption. In recent years, the emphasis for developing countries has been on
minimizing energy use without sacrificing economic output. Broadly speaking, the goal is to
ensure nations derive economic value from activities that are increasingly less energy
intensive and maximize efficiency, which is measured in terms of energy inputs required for
the production of goods. Concerns about climate change have added a new indicator to
macroeconomic performance: to reduce the carbon intensity of these production processes
and of energy inputs themselves.
From the perspective of economics, the classical model for growth assumes there are two key
drivers: invested capital stock and labor supply. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Nobel-prize
winning economist Robert Solow pointed out that this model successfully explained only one
seventh of economic growth experienced in the previous decades. He argued that there must
be another driver for growth that cannot be articulated with economic variables-the so-
called "Solow residual," often equated with technological progress. Physicist and economist
Robert Ayres argues that this model can easily lead to the belief that growth can continue
indefinitely, without societies knowing exactly how or why. According to Ayres, the third
factor is "the increasing thermodynamic efficiency with which energy and raw materials are
converted into useful work." (Ayres & Ayres, 2010:14) Accordingly, the goal is to
simultaneously reduce energy costs, fuel use, and greenhouse emissions, i.e., to maximize the
growing use of energy service. Otherwise, if the rate of efficiency gains slows in the future,
economic growth will slow as well.
Yet, even before the publication of the Brundtland report, critics wondered if it would ever be
possible to sustain economic and energy gains without substantial, irreversible
environmental damage and conflict. Over thirty years ago, commenting on the reactions to
the oil crisis from the late 1970s, philosopher Ivan Illich succinctly articulated this problem:
It has recently become fashionable to insist on an impending energy crisis. This euphemistic term
conceals a contradiction and consecrates an illusion. It masks the contradiction implicit in the joint
pursuit of equity and industrial growth. It safeguards the illusion that machine power can
indefinitely take the place of manpower. To resolve this contradiction and dispel this illusion, it is
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urgent to clarify the reality that the language of crisis obscures: high quanta of energy degrade
social relations just as inevitably as they destroy the physical milieu. (Illich, 1978)
Aware of this contradiction, states must advance strong political justifications for their
development agendas. This will be evident in the cases presented in these pages. The
Ecuadorian government, in spite of having passed admirably progressive environmental and
social legislation since 2007, calls upon sovereignty and the right to develop as priority goals
over other considerations. PerG's plans for large hydropower in the country's Amazon region
are carried out in the name of regional integration and a strengthening of economies ties
with its powerful neighbor, Brazil. Chile depends strongly on mining for its economic
growth-close to 20% of GDP, according to Chile's Central Bank-but relies on foreign fuels
for electricity production; its plans for large hydropower respond to the need for national
security, which can easily take precedence over other political objectives.
The interplay between economic growth, sovereignty over resources, and environmental and
social degradation is a defining characteristic of development in South America, in spite of
the ideological changes since the post-WWII era. Top-down development planning was once
in vogue; its runway was the world's underdeveloped nations. In the second half of the XX
century, comprehensive development planning was "mankind's most ambitious collective
enterprise, the activity of nation-states attempting to bring into being ideal worlds."
(Robertson, 1984, quoted in Ferguson, 1990) Under the banner of modernization, the
developing world experienced some of the most capital-intensive infrastructural
transformations in its history, through top-down economic planning.
The important point is that, as this paper attempts to show, state-led or state-mediated
energy ventures continues to be a central factor in Ecuador's, PerO's, and Chile's self-sustained
growth. "Self-sustained" is an elusive adjective, especially when applied to development. In
their seminal development economics work Dependency and Development in Latin America,
Cardoso and Faletto use the concept of "self-sustained growth" at the very opening of their
book yet they only implicitly clarify its meaning in the ensuing pages. The authors hint at a
combination of a strong domestic production base and an optimal level of financial and
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political autonomy: "a society can undergo profound changes in its production system
without the creation of fully autonomous decision-making centers." (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979:
18) Energy goods play an interesting dual role: the industry is part of the capital-goods sector,
and thus a hub for growth in and of itself; yet it also provides important inputs for production.
Countries can have the latter without necessary developing the former (e.g., Japan). In other
words, when countries demonstrate a staunch nationalist energy policy, it is only partially
explained by the imperative to grow GDP. Werner Baer, in his discussion of Brazilian
development, convincingly argues that oil nationalism is but one element in a historic trend
in the region: the expansion of the state as a key economic agent in the most profitable areas
of production, including steel, agricultural crops, and fertilizers. (Baer, 2007)
Climate change adds a layer of complexity to the political debate on energy futures. Concerns
about its effects give governments a political opportunity to enact some far-reaching
proposals, such as the deployment of costlier but cleaner renewable energy technologies.
Development agendas today entail more than priority industries or activities for future
economic growth. National security and sovereignty are at risk not in terms of energy but also
in terms of impending environmental disaster and the potential for social upheaval; global
warming presents a real threat to our capacity to safeguard these three in the long-term; the
question for science is not really whether this will happen, but rather how bad and who will
be the worst off.'
Thus, justifications for any kind of change, including decisions about controversial energy
megaprojects such as large dams, presently invoke the language of crisis (the threat of
environmental catastrophe) and scarcity (the danger of economic catastrophe). Rajagopal,
quoting Esteva, puts it best:
'[T]he consistency between observed and modeled changes in several studies and the spatial agreement
between significant regional warming and consistent impacts at the global scale is sufficient to conclude with
high confidence that anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has had a discernible influence on
many physical and biological systems. (PCC, 2007:9)
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[S]carcity, which means "the technical assumption that man's wants are great, not to say infinite,
whereas his means are limited though improvable. The assumption implies choices over the
allocation of means (resources). This 'fact' defines the 'economic problem' par excellence, whose
'solution' is proposed by economists through the market or the plan." The concept of scarcity is at
the heart of development. (Rajagopal, 2003: 200)
Energy and its conceptual corollary, scarcity, are central to arguments about sovereignty and
political autonomy: control over the ability to exploit and sell fossil fuels is a historic tenet of
anti-imperialist discourse as well as a catalyst for (and financing of) state-driven development.
This is how hydropower, as well as oil, gas, and minerals, connect national security,
sovereignty, and development. As will be discussed in the following chapters, this is a
common thread in the cases Ecuador's CCS, Chile's HidroAysen, and PerO's Inambari projects.
Pierre Belanger notes that, throughout history, the "infrastructure of fuels and feedstocks" on
which our economic activities depend has evolved not necessarily by design but according to
a "genealogy of substitutions and shortages." (Belanger, 2009) Coal saved the forests and
petroleum saved the whales. Energy planning in South America appears to be going through
one such substitution. As will be shown in the following chapters, the 1990s and 2000s
marked a steady carbonization of Ecuador's, PerO's, and Chile's energy mix; while in Ecuador
the reason can be traced to underinvestment in riskier projects with big capacity for
generation, PerO and Chile capitalized on the discovery of natural gas reserves-
comparatively cleaner and cheaper (at least initially) than oil products and coal. Exposure to
volatile fossil fuel prices and the need to meet growing demand have now turned these
governments' attention to hydropower and, to a lesser extent, non-traditional renewables,
such as solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal energy.
The call for cleaner technologies is today representative of a global shift in this genealogy.
Alone, it represents a minor utopia: the hope for improvements in one specific sector (the
main appeal of renewable energy is that is theoretically limitless; the minor utopian wish-
fulfillment being complicit with endless growth). A switch of this kind would not change the
basic relationship between energy and GDP, which is one of constant and mutual
maximization; the latter cannot increase without the former, the former reproduces and
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magnifies the impacts of the latter. Conditions of inequality will not change with new,
renewable feedstocks: "a universal social straitjacket will be the inevitable outcome of
ecological restraints on total energy use imposed by industrial-minded planners bent on
keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum." (Illich, 1978)
Hydropower may yet bring cheaper electricity, anchor regional economic development in the
Amazon and Patagonia regions, or even curb levels of greenhouse gas emissions, thus
becoming South America's answer to Belanger's genealogy of substitutions. A carbon-free
utopia begins as an imagined life without competition for resources and social equity, but
ultimately appears as government-led ameliorated capitalism. (Jameson, 2005) These results
will not be possible without significant intervention from the Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and
Chilean states to justify and ultimately legitimize the reasons for massive transformations to
the environment and communities.
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Chapter 1. Recent Trends in Electricity Markets in Ecuador, Chile,
and Peru
In early 2012, Chile's Ministry of Energy published a short, 40-page report outlining the long-
term vision for electricity in the country, to guide all policies in the sector in the 2013-2030
period. The adjectives "limpia, segura, econ6mica" repeat throughout the document,
highlighting the basic objectives for decisions in the sector-clean, secure, and economically-
attractive electricity. It is hard to argue against any of these three qualifiers. Yet, a closer look
at the actual performance data from Chile's electricity sector reveals the difficulty in
prioritizing from a set of objectives given resource constraints. Put simply, what is clean is not
always cheap, and what is secure is not always clean.
This conundrum applies just as well to energy planning in Ecuador and Pero. Since the
publication of the country's Strategies and Policies to Change Ecuador's Energy Mix (2008), the
government of Ecuador has taken a decisive role in the development of expensive and
controversial hydropower and fossil-fired energy projects. The energy sector must "transition
out of crisis mode into one of rational and efficient use of resources (...) and make
investments to ensure reliable, cheap, and environmentally sustainable supplies of energy"
(MEER, 2008: 11) In Pero, the Ministry of Energy outlined the sector's priorities with the
publication of a general strategy document, The Energy Sector: Guiding Report (2010). "It is of
primary importance to provide secure, continuous, and quality electricity (...) with a modern
regulatory scheme that has evolved to meet various economic, social, environmental, and
climate challenges." (MINEM, 201 Oa: 3) Peruvian authorities seek to balance centralized
planning-to maximize benefits from the country's massive natural gas reserves-with
enough incentives for private investors to develop cleaner electricity generation projects,
such as small hydropower.
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To shed light on the actual performance of the electricity sector in each country, as well as the
main challenges affecting the region, this section offers relevant statistics from Ecuador, Pern,
and Chile. These data serve as backdrop for a full discussion of regulatory and institutional
dynamics, included in the next two chapters (unless otherwise noted, information was
collected directly from these countries' Ministries of energy and electricity).
Supply
The cost of fuel is one of the most important metrics driving the enthusiasm for large-scale
hydropower in South America. Most countries in the region are significant exporters of
hydrocarbons, principally oil and gas. Ecuador has the third largest crude reserves in South
America, while PerO is the third largest producer of natural gas in the region. (CIA, 2012)
However, these countries are importers of refined oil products and are thus vulnerable to
price volatility. Similarly, Chile does not have equally large hydrocarbon reserves and thus
relies on coal, gas, and oil imports to fully meet its energy needs.
These facts are especially relevant from an electricity portfolio perspective. The three case
countries source a considerable portion of its electricity from thermal, fossil-fueled plants-
between 47% and 60% of total. (Figs. 1-6; for consistency, the data below spans the period
from 1990-2008, years for which official figures were available across all countries). Price
changes in global fossil feedstocks can result in higher fuel expenses for thermal generation,
which in turn increases the cost of delivery in the electricity sector as a whole. To reduce this
exposure, these three countries, like others in the region, see it as a matter of security to
diversify their generation.
Table 2 highlights the potential for future hydropower development in the region. The
hydropower inventory numbers do not reflect economic considerations, which are site-
sensitive, and thus only assume technical feasibility. Yet, even if economic constraints rule out
the possibility for 100% development, it is reasonable to expect growth in hydropower
development.
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Table 2. Hydropower inventory in South America. From CIER (2009).
Country Inventory (GW) Developed (%) Installed (GW)
Argentina 45 21 9,3
Bolivia 40 1 0,5
Brasil 185 41 76,3
Chile 25 235,7
Colombia 93 9 8,8
Ecuador 23 9 2,0
Mexico 53 24 12,7
Paraguay 13 67 8,7
___ ___ ___ 62' 5 __ __ __ __ __
Uruguay 2 93 1,5
Venezuela 28 52 14,6
TOTAL 594 25 147,3
Ecuador
According to CONELEC's 2009 Master Plan for Electrification, over 47% of electricity produced
in Ecuador came from hydropower and 35% from thermal sources. The country derives
almost 90% of its hydropower from five plants: Hidropaute (1,075MW), San Francisco
(230MW), Marcel Laniado (213MW), Agoyan (156MW), and Pucara (74MW). (Salazar & Rudnick,
2008) This concentration has put the country at occasional risk. From November 2009 to
February 2010, the government imposed shortages due to unusually low levels of rainfall.
While historically Ecuador has relied on imports from Colombia to meet peak demand, the
latter had its own supply constraints and limited dispatch of power to the south. Since then,
the government has aggressively pushed for investments in new generation.
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Figure 1. Ecuador Installed Capacity (MW). From CONELEC (2012).
Renewables include wind and solar plants. Small hydro included in the Hydro category.
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Figure 2. Ecuador Electricity Generation (GWh). From CONELEC (2012).
Renewables include wind and solar plants. Small hydro included in the Hydro category.
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Perd
Close to 30% of total generation facilities in Per6 are state-owned. ElectroPero, the biggest
public utility, supplies close to 25% of Per6's total electricity. (CIER, 2011) Endesa, Spain's
largest utility and the biggest electricity operator in Chile, is also the biggest private actor in
PerO: it owns close to 2,000MW of installed capacity, over 20% of total generation. (Endesa,
2012) While hydropower provided almost 60% of total power in 2009, in recent years,
investments in this technology have been small compared to investments in natural gas.
Since the expansion of the Camisea Gas Field in 2007, gas prices for local use are among the
lowest in the world. The government has actively pushed for consumption of this resource,
subsidizing costs of natural gas for domestic uses. (WB - ESMAP, 2010) As a result, thermal
generation has increased considerably in recent years. Even though the government is
pursuing policies to spark investments in small- and medium-size hydroelectric projects (e.g.,
Law No. 27435, which eliminated the need to present a complete economic feasibility study
in order to receive hydropower concessions), there are insufficient economic incentives for
investors to diversify electricity generation or improve the efficiency of gas plants.
Figure 3. Perd Installed Capacity (MW). From Ministerio d e Energia y Minas del Per6, 2010.
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Figure 4. PerO Electricity Generation (GWh). From Ministerio de Energia y Minas del Pert, 2010.
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Chile
Chile faces challenging conditions for energy supply, since it does not have considerable local
hydrocarbon reserves. The country relies heavily on thermal plants to meet its electricity
needs, which accounted for more than 60% of total production in 2010. (MINERGIA, 2009) The
country imports oil, coal, and gas products to power these plants. Historically, natural gas
came from neighboring Argentina, through six different pipelines along the border; however,
following major shortages in 2004, transactions between the two countries are today virtually
non-existent. Over the last five years, Chile has developed two regasification plants, to ensure
conversion of liquid natural gas imports from the Caribbean and Africa. (CIER, 2011) Thus,
hydropower supplies most of the country's locally-sourced power (approximately 35% in
2010).
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Figure 5. Chile Installed Capacity (MW). From MINERGIA, 2009. Official sources do not provide aggregate
data on imports; 643MW come from the Gener Salta plant, which ships power to both Argentina and Chile.
Renewables include wind, solar, and geothermal plants, though official sources do not provide sub-
categorical data. Small hydro is included in the Hydro category.
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Figure 6. Chile Installed Capacity (MW). From MINERGIA, 2009.
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Chile has been a fully competitive electricity market since the 1980s. Notably, there is a high
degree of concentration in the sector. Three companies, Endesa, Colbtin, and AES Gener,
control close to 90% of all generation. Given the country's reliance on hydropower for locally-
sourced power, it is important to note that Endesa owns 75% of existing water rights in the
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country, further intensifying the concentration of hydropower resources (actual and potential
and including HidroAysen, on which Endesa has a 51% stake). (CADE, 2011; lEA, 2009)
Table 3. Ownership of Water Rights with Hydropower Potential in Chile. From CADE, 2011.
In development Undeveloped Total
Flow Power Flow Power Flow Power
Company (m3/s) % (MW) % (m3/s) % (MW) % (m3/s) % (MW) %
Endesa 1,937 50 3,452 61 2,743 18 3,120 23 4,680 25 6,572 35
HidroAysen 0 0 0 0 3,032 20 2,750 21 3,032 16 2,750 15
Gener 79 2 271 5 1,262 8 1,517 11 1,341 7 1,788 9
ColbOn 958 25 1,051 19 2,102 14 1,034 8 3,060 16 2,085 11
Xstrata 0 0 0 0 442 3 1,014 8 442 2 1,014 5
SNPower 134 3 321 6 341 2 832 6 475 3 1,153 6
L Quiroga 0 0 0 0 918 6 726 5 918 5 726 4
CGE 82 2 124 2 382 3 383 3 464 2 507 3
Pilmaiquen 0 0 0 0 698 5 169 1 698 4 169 1
Pulinque-P. 200 5 87 2 113 1 25 0 313 2 112 1
Other 504 13 321 6 2,874 19 1,736 13 3,378 18 2,057 11
TOTAL 3,894 100 5,627 100 14,907 100 13,306 100 18,801 100 18,933 100
Recognizing the growing importance of renewables in the supply of power, in 2007 the
government approved Law 20.257, which established targets for deployment for solar, wind,
geothermal, small hydro, and biomass plants: 10% by 2024. Though Chile has built important
renewable energy projects in recent years, these represent less than 1 % of total power
delivery. The controversy over large hydropower development, focused mostly on HA, has
sparked a move to upgrade this law and set more aggressive targets for deployment: 20% by
2020.
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Demand
Chile's economy is considerably larger than Ecuador's and Per6's. According to data from the
World Bank, Chile's 2010 GDP was $212 billion, compared to PerG's $157 billion and Ecuador's
$58 billion. Despite a contraction in all three economies during the 2008 world economic
crisis-a slump that particularly affected Chile-economic growth has shown an annual
average increase over the last decade.
Figure 7. GDP (current US$, in billions). From data.worldbank.org
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On a per capita basis, Chile's larger GDP translates into comparatively larger electricity
consumption. (Fig. 8) Interestingly, Per6's consumption closely matches that of Ecuador,
which suggests that Pero utilizes its electricity more efficiently than Ecuador toward the
production of economic output, on a per capita basis (see greenhouse gas emissions section
below for a more complete analysis).
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Figure 8. Electricity consumption per capita (kWh). From data.worldbank.org
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Over the last decade, electricity consumption has shown a steady growth in all three
countries. However, demand drivers vary greatly from country to country. Mining and
extractive industries represents large portions of Per6's and Chile's GDP-between 10 and
15%-as well as total electricity demand. (CIA, 2012) Ecuador's economy relies heavily on
crude oil and agricultural exports, which entail comparatively less energy-intensive processes.
Ecuador
Demand patterns in the country reflect the fact that Ecuador's economic growth does not rely
heavily on energy-intensive industry, but rather on exports of primary goods. Ccodring to
CONELEC's 2010 electricity statistics report, almost all of the 'regulated' clients belong to the
residential sector-over 85% of total consumers. This sector accounted for close to 40% of
total demand in 2010. The industrial and commercial sectors represented approximately 30%
and 20% of total consumption.
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Figure 9. Ecuador - Electricity Sales by Sector (GWh). From CON ELEC, 2010
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While Ecuador allows private contracts between generation companies and consumers,
almost 100% of all electricity users source their power in the regulated retail market, from
regional utilities. Ecuador has 20 such companies, all of which are majority publicly-owned.
Ten of these operate under a single, state-owned holding company, the Electric Corporation
of Ecuador (CELEC). The remaining companies are stand-alone public companies, working
under geographically-defined concessions.
Perd
According to PerO's Ministry of Energy and Mines, electricity demand grew by an average
annual rate of 8% since 2005. This growth is the result of an expansion in mining and
manufacturing. PerO was resilient to the global financial crisis in 2008 and showed continued
growth during this period. As a result, investments in the sector in the same five-year period
grew by an average annual 27%. Energy authorities project continued demand growth rates
of 7-9% in the next ten years. (MINEM, 201 0a, 2010b) 10 majority publicly-owned and 14
private distribution companies serve users in the regulated and free contract markets.
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Figure 10. Perd - Electricity Sales by Sector (GWh). From MINEM, 2010b
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Large electricity consumers who set contracts directly with generators and distributors
conform PerO's "free" electricity market and represent 46% of overall demand. In 2008, mining
activities consumed 54.3% of demand. The largest user is Southern Pero Copper Corporation
(SPCC), which is also the largest copper mine in the country; the 10 largest users, of which six
were mining companies, three were smelting/metallurgical industries, and one was a cement
company, represented electricity consumption of about 6,310 GWh in 2008 (one-half of total
consumption of large users). (WB - ESMAP, 2010)
Chile
Unlike Pero, Chile's economic growth and its demand needs shrunk following the global
financial crisis. The country is just beginning to recover its demand growth trajectories-
approximately 7-8% per year. The country's geography contributes to clusters of activity in
electricity markets. There are two main electricity networks: the Central Interconnected
System (SIC), which represents 76% of all installed capacity and delivers power to over 90% of
the country's population; and the Great North Interconnected System (SING), representing
23% of total capacity and supplying almost 90% of power to mining operations. The SIC has
over 12GW of installed capacity for generation; Endesa holds 28%, Colban 19%, and AES
Gener 10% of total. (IEA, 2009) Two smaller networks exist to the south of the SIC, not yet
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connected to the larger network: Aysen and Magallanes, each with three and four sub-
networks, respectively.
Figure 11. Chile - Electricity Distribution by Sector (GWh). From Ministerio de Energia de Chile, 2010.
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One of the most succinct ways of expressing the link between energy consumption, carbon
emissions, and growth is the Kaya identity.2 The formula defines carbon emissions as the
product of a set of measurable variables: population, gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita, energy use per unit of GDP, carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed. (Ehrlich &
Holdren, 1971; Kaya, Yamaji, Matsuhashi, & Nagata, 1991; Raupach et al., 2007) The Kaya
identity is expressed in the following formula: F = P *(G/P)*(E/G)*(F/E), where F represents CO2
emissions from anthropogenic sources; P is the global (or local) population; G is GDP; E is
primary or secondary energy consumption.
E/G provides a measure for energy intensity, i.e., the energy required to produce a unit of
GDP. Generally, wealthier nations use energy more efficiently, but there are developing
2 The Kaya identity has its roots in the IPAT identity, theorized in the 1970s by Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren. The
impacts on the environment can be expressed as a function of three variables: population (P), affluence (A), and
technology (T). The relationship is expressed as I = P*A*T.
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economies that show high levels of efficiency in terms of energy intensity as well as
developed economies that are comparatively 'inefficient.' F/E provides a measure of the
carbon intensity of energy, a useful metric to assess the 'cleanliness'or a country's energy mix,
including electricity generation. Comparison of carbon intensity across countries can show
whether they generate relatively little wealth from CO2emissions; typically, carbon intense
economies burn fossils with high CO2 content, such as coal, and other fuels that generate
more pollutants during combustion (or during the entire lifecycle of electricity production).
As the chart below shows, Chile has the highest levels of emissions per capita, a fact that is
consistent with the economic indicators shown above-the country's GDP is considerably
larger. It is important to note that serious emissions reduction targets cannot simply look at
efficiency of energy inputs; a country may make considerable gains in this respect while still
increasing overall emissions overtime (e.g., the United States).
Figure 12. CO2 Emissions (metric tons per capita). From data.worldbank.org
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Over half of all emissions in South America are the result of land use change and forestry
(LULUCF) 3, followed by agriculture. This is a stark contrast from other regions in the world,
such as Europe and North America, where the energy sector (fuel combustion from
transportation and electricity generation) account for a large portion of emissions. At first
glance, the fact that Chile-a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) since 2010-has an economic profile that more closely resembles that
of developed nations, explains the great difference between its emissions and those from
Ecuador and PerO.
Figure 13. South America GHG Emissions per Sector (2005). From CAIT - WRI, 2012
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Interestingly, Per's emissions per capita are lower than Ecuador's, in spite of the fact that the
latter has a smaller economic output. This could respond to the difference in the sectorial
contributions to overall emissions in both countries. Though Pero has published official
figures only up to the year 2000, the data shows that LULUCF is the main contributor to
emissions (48%), followed by energy (21%) and agricultural processes (19%) (Fig. 15).
3 As defined by the UN Climate Change Secretariat, this is "a greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers
emissions and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct human-induced land use, land-use change
and forestry activities." http://unfccc.int/essential background/qlossary/items/3666.php#L
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Figure 14. Ecuador GHG Emissions per Sector (2006). From MAE, 2011
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In the energy sector, transportation accounts for almost 40% of total emissions, while energy
conversion activities represent only 12%. (MINAM, 2010) In Ecuador, agriculture accounts for
one half of total emissions, while LULUCF emissions represent 39% and energy only 12%. In
general, the majority of agricultural emissions in both countries come from the use of nitrous
oxide (NO2) as a fertilizer, a gas with much higher warming potential than CO2 and methane
(CH4). In this sense, one could infer that Ecuador's higher dependence on agriculture, and the
agricultural practices related to it, translates into higher emissions per capita. Unsurprisingly,
sectorial data from Chile show that energy is the largest contributor of carbon emissions. (Fig.
16).
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Figure 15. Perd GHG Emissions per Sector (2000). From MINAM, 2010
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Figure 16. Chile GHG Emissions per Sector (2003). From CONAMA, 2010
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While the difference in sectorial contributions may partially explain the difference in per
capita emissions, lower per capita figures could also reflect that Pero produces economic
output more efficiently than Ecuador, which should be evident in energy intensity figures.
Indeed, as the chart below shows, Pero produces significantly more wealth per unit of energy
used (kg. of oil equivalent). Chile ranks below Ecuador, which again confirms the country's
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economic profile: growth driven by energy-intensive extractive industries that obtain their
power from fossil-fired plants.
Figure 17. GDP per unit of energy used (constant 2005 PPP$ per kg. of oil equivalent). From
data.worldbank.org
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Chile has maintained comparatively constant carbon intensity per unit of energy in the last
two decades. In the years before the 2008 economic downturn, Pero's figures show a strong
increase, which can be the result of significant growth. It is notable that Ecuador, in spite of
having a much smaller economic output, is not far behind the other two countries in terms of
carbon intensity.
While it is necessary to dive deeper into each sector of the economy better to understand
particular drivers of emissions, the overall data for greenhouse gas emissions in the three case
countries shows some general trends and patterns. Chile's and Ecuador's economies are more
GHG-intensive than Pero's. However, there are considerable in-country differences: Chile's
intensity comes from large-scale extractive industries and the energy needed to power them,
whereas Ecuador's emissions are in large part the result of agricultural practices and
aggressive land use changes.
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Figure 18. CO2 Intensity (kg. per kg. of oil equivalent)
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Within the energy sector, transportation contributes to a large portion of carbon emissions;
should these countries take decisive action, they should focus their policies on this energy
sub-sector. In the electricity subsector, Pero fares better than the other two countries, a fact
that is consistent with the country's reliance on natural gas for electricity production.
Compared to coal and diesel, fuels commonly used in thermal plants in Ecuador and Pero,
natural gas has lower carbon content and thus contributes fewer emissions.
Pero displays more efficient production processes, as measured by energy intensity. The use
of natural gas does not fully explain Pero's comparatively cleaner profile, but rather from the
contribution of waste toward total emissions. In contrast, Chile has seen a considerable
increase in waste-related emissions. However, the country has maintained a somewhat
consistent profile of carbon intensity per unit of energy, suggesting that, to curb emissions in
the long-run, more gains can me made by focusing initiatives on extractive industries.
Nonetheless, a switch to cleaner energy generation technologies, such as natural gas and
hydropower, could also play an important toward the reduction of overall carbon emissions.
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The Coca-Codo-Sinclair (CCS) dam is, by any measure, an extraordinary enterprise for Ecuador.
At an estimated cost (2012) of $2.245 billion4-excluding off budget costs for overruns and
financing-it is one of the most expensive public works projects in the country's history. It is
remarkable both as a feat of engineering as well as one of politics. Once completed, CCS will
have an installed capacity for electricity generation of 1,500MW, making it the largest power
plant in the country. The project requires the construction of a tunnel, 25 kilometers long, to
channel water (222m 3/s) from the Coca river toward an underground power turbine hall
further downstream-a feasible yet risky and expensive undertaking.
CCS's construction comes after two decades of underinvestment in large-scale hydroelectric
projects, a time during which the country tried and failed to create a decentralized energy
market. After years of political instability-Ecuador has had seven heads of state since the
1996 Electricity Sector Law unbundled electricity services-President Rafael Correa assumed
full control of the energy, water, and telecommunications sectors. Following severe blackouts
in late 2009, Correa's government is dusting off and finally building a number of large
hydropower projects that were originally conceived in the 1970s and 80s. State-driven
development of projects like CCS has the potential of cleaning up an energy mix that relies
mostly on fossil fuels. Yet, the potential for environmental and social impacts, which range
from significant changes to the Coca river's ecosystem, to disruptive urbanization in
conservation areas near CCS, raises questions about the state's capacity to internalize
impacts. Public opposition has been met with firm measures from Correa's government,
including the militarization of buffer zones around hydropower sites for reasons of "national
security," a decision that underscores the unique and controversial nature of CCS.
4 See Coca-Codo-Sinclair factsheet, www.meer.gob.ec
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While an outlier in Ecuador, the CCS dam is nonetheless emblematic of recent energy
planning trends in water-rich South American countries. From the outset, Correa's ministers
singled out CCS as the only project capable of meeting growing demands for energy, as well
as the need for a 'cleaner' electricity generation portfolio. This dual goal favors water projects
of considerable scale. Once built, a large hydropower complex with a generous reservoir
provides reliable and often cheaper electricity generation, as well as energy storage capacity,
which makes dams especially useful in combination with intermittent sources such as wind
and solar power. More importantly, utilizing water resources for power generation avoids the
price and supply risks associated with fuel imports, i.e., CCS and other such projects become a
matter of national security. With these goals in mind, Ecuador, as well as many other countries
in South America, have recently revived plans for hydropower megaprojects.
CCS is representative of another important trend. Its construction embodies what I call
"south-south development ventures." Substantial financial and technical support comes from
other national institutions, such as China's Import-Export Bank and from power developers
such as Sinohydro and Goldwind. South-south development ventures open up new financing
options for megaprojects, sources that come without clear procedural rules and safeguards.
How was the design and development of CCS carried out overtime? At what levels and by
whom were key decisions made, and what can they tell us about the politics of hydropower?
What are the implications for future investment in energy projects, especially with regard to
potential alternatives-costlier and intermittent sources such as wind, solar, or geothermal?
How does the new political and economic context of south-south development ventures
affect the consideration of social and environmental impacts, as well as the governance of
megaprojects in contested territories?
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State-led Development and the Advent of Hydropower in Ecuador
Plans for a dam on the Coca river basin start to appear in the bureaucratic records in the mid
1970s, as part of the first round of hydropower inventory assessment studies. (Decker Coello,
1990) By 1978, a study on the rivers in the Napo province, in Western, 'Amazonian' Ecuador,
identified the potential to generate up to 3,000MW-over half of Ecuador's present installed
capacity. Yet it was not until the late 1980s that energy authorities began the first round of
feasibility studies and identified design options for a hydropower complex on the Coca
watershed.
In Ecuador, the charting of the hydrological inventory coincides with the consolidation of the
country's electricity regulator and main utility company, INECEL, which was founded in 1954.
Ecuador's electricity sector was originally composed of a few isolated power systems, built to
meet the demands of scattered urban centers and a slowly expanding industrial sector; in the
late 1950s, the electrification rate was merely 17%. (Pel6ez-Samaniego, Garcia-Perez, Cortez,
Oscullo, & Olmedo, 2007) Yet, not unlike other power systems around the world, the need for
better coordination across independent systems resulted in the establishment of centralized
planning and operation agencies.5
INECEL played an important role in Ecuador's larger vision for a state-driven development
model, one that gradually took hold two decades after its founding in the 1950s. Full
realization of this model came in the 1970s with the consolidation of state power under the
military rule of General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara (1972-1976) and the Military Triumvirate
(1976-1979), who were blessed with excess cash from oil extraction. Crude prices shot up
following the 1973 global oil crisis, rising from $2.5 to $35.2 per barrel between 1972 and
1980. (Ayala Mora & Fern6ndez, 1995) It was a fever that ran through almost all of South
I While the chronology varies across countries, the history of consolidation of energy planning authorities, system regulators
and operators, and vertically-integrated utilities is notably similar across the Americas and other regions in the world. Some
early examples include the United States' Federal Power Commission, a federal oversight body created in 1930 to coordinate
wholesale electric rates, hydroelectric licensing, natural gas pricing, and oil pipeline rates, and Chile's Superintendencia de
Electricidad y Combustibles, created in 1904 to regulate the quality of operations in electricity, gas, and oil services.
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America: the military rulers of the day embraced external debt financing to build large
infrastructure projects. Excess liquidity catalyzed the governments' capacity to fulfill import-
substitution strategies and social investments in areas such as housing and education. In
Ecuador, priority areas included oil, large-scale agriculture, and transportation; between 1971
and 1983, the country's external debt increased thirtyfold. (Martin-Mayoral, 2009)
The legacy of the military is especially evident in the energy sector. While the Triumvirate was
considerably more market-oriented than Rodriguez Lara's administration,6 both governments
believed in the critical role the state played in energy infrastructure and its intimate
relationship with sovereign access to natural resources. During this decade, the country
renegotiated critical contracts with oil giants Texaco and Gulf, developed refining capacity in
the country's northwestern coast, and founded the country's state-owned oil company, CEPE
(Petroecuador, in its present incarnation). In fact, this is a critical element in Ecuador's (as well
as that of other Amazonian countries such as Brazil, Pero, and Colombia) historic territorial
conquest. From the colonial era through the days of the military dictatorship to the present,
rulers have seen sovereignty over natural resources, especially those in the Amazon region, as
central to national security. James C. Scott's succinctly articulates the link between state
sovereignty and nature:
... the moment [common property] became scarce (when "nature" became "natural
resources"), it became the subject of property rights in law, whether of the state or of the
citizens. The history of property in this sense has meant the inexorable incorporation of what
were once thought of as free gifts of nature... into a property regime. (Scott, 1999)
Starting in the 70s, the Ecuadorian state began to "incorporate" national resources for primary
and secondary energy. CEPE's refineries temporarily provided fuels for thermoelectric
generation-the facilities in the province of Esmeraldas would be severely mismanaged and
inefficient in the following decades-plants that represented almost 80% of Ecuador's total
installed capacity by 1980. (CONELEC, 2009) In terms of electricity, the state and INECEL made
targeted investments in the development of hydropower-a technology that rapidly gained
6 See P. Gondard and H. Mazurek (2001) and Martin-Mayoral, F. (2009).
54
The Role of the State in Large.-Scale Hydropower Development
prominence as the cheapest and most reliable source for electricity, especially vis-A-vis plants
that relied on fossil feedstock. Hydroelectric projects were preferred not only by multilateral
agencies such as the World Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEPAL), but also by European aid agencies and governments. Indeed, the Spanish
government partially funded Ecuador's countrywide hydrologic inventory and water resource
plan, completed in 1982. (CEPAL - Comisi6n Econ6mica para America Latina y el Caribe, 1990)
During this period, the country grew its generation capacity considerably, from less than
200MW in 1961 to close to 2,500MW by the late 1980s. (CONELEC, 2009) This figure includes
what is still the largest hydroelectric dam complex in the country, Hidropaute, built in three
phases between 1976 and 1991 and with an installed capacity of 1,075MW. It is located in
southwestern Ecuador, in the 'high' Amazonian basin, where the great majority of
hydroelectric plants operate. The project on the Paute basin is a landmark hydroelectric
megaproject: it effectively switched Ecuador's generation mix by increasing the share of
hydropower from 20% in 1980 to 61% in 1993 (Paute itself represented almost two thirds of
this share).
Hidropaute is Ecuador's main baseload plant; as such, it has continuously worked as an
indicator of reliability in the electricity sector, especially when generation trails behind
growing demand (a gap that was particularly acute in 2009, as will be discussed below).
During the Amazonian rainy season, between April and September, the project delivers
energy at full or close to full capacity. From October to March, Ecuador is under routine threat
of energy shortages; without a project of similar size in the country's eastern basins, the so-
called Pacific watershed, there are no complementary plants capable of meeting full
electricity needs.
Shortages can be the result of inadequacies in either power or energy supply. Power
generally refers to a system's installed capacity; overall, Ecuador may have large enough
plants (measured in megawatts) for generation to meet projected demand. However,
operational problems, such as lack of access to fuels, may prevent the fleet from generating
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sufficient energy (measured in megawatts produced per unit of time, i.e., MW/h). Countries
that rely on hydropower to meet energy needs have an incentive to optimize their portfolio
of plants in such as way as to avoid problems associated with water shortages. As will be
discussed in Chapter 3, Brazil is the paradigmatic example of a hydro-based system with
centralized optimization of water resources.
The gradual development of Hidropaute significantly cleaned Ecuador's energy mix-a
relative success of state-driven energy infrastructure development. Its scale reduced the need
for imported fuels for thermal plants, thus decreasing the cost of energy and improving
security. However, it is a risky proposition to rely on a single, large-scale plant, complemented
by a handful of smaller hydro projects of no more than 200MW in capacity.
Scholars refer to the experiences from the 70s as examples of the "entrepreneurial state,"
modeled after the Gerschenkronian premise that developing countries, late-starters in the
path toward industrialization, needed direct state intervention to advance local economic
activity. (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hirschman, 1968) In the electricity sector, the Ecuadorian
government's 'entrepreneurial' record is mixed in this regard. Since the drafting of the first
hydrological inventories, large hydroelectric projects have always played a central role in
power generation-at least hypothetically. By 1989, as stated in its 1989-2000 long-term
electricity expansion plan, INECEL had identified 21GW of economically feasible projects, 90%
of which were located in Amazonian rivers. (CONELEC, 2009) Yet, the country's potential
remains largely untapped.
Beginning in the 1980s, the so-called 'lost decade,' there were at least three factors that
significantly hemmed in large dam building efforts. Ecuador and other countries in the region
entered an external debt crisis and adopted structural-adjustment programs. Funds dried up
for large infrastructure projects and public investments; CCS and other projects were shelved,
or repeatedly postponed. Second, around the world, multilateral organizations and private
financers became much more risk-averse, not only from a financial perspective, but also due
to the alarming environmental and social impacts of projects. (McCully, 2001) These included
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not only dams, but also highways that unleashed rapid deforestation, migration, and
displacement of thousands of people. Finally, the transition to democratic rule in the 1980s
gave a stronger voice to the concerns of affected populations, a change that became
embodied through improved national environmental legislation. In this context, a central
question for the state was how best to develop and reap benefits from its resources,
especially in terms of basic infrastructure services such as energy. The answer, almost
universally, was the privatization and deregulation of state enterprises.
Figure 19. Map of Ecuador's General Hydrology for Electricity Generation. In 2010, over 80% of Ecuador's
hydropower capacity came from six plants: HidroPaute-Molino (1,075 MW), Mazar (160 MW), San Francisco
(230 MW), Marcel Laniado de Wind (213 MW), Agoydn (156 MW) and Pucard (73 MW). Marcel Laniado de
Wind is the only plant located on the Pacific watershed.
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Neoliberal Reform and the Carbonization of the Energy Mix
Starting in 1988, under the democratic, center-left government of Rodrigo Borja, INECEL
commissioned a set of feasibility studies for CCS. Completed in 1992, the work would
capitalize on water flow measurements taken from 1976 to the late 1980s and move toward a
more comprehensive analysis of design options based on geological and soil conditions.
Ecuador paid $20 million for the study, which was led by the Italian firm Electroconsult (the
company that designed, built, and developed the gargantuan, 12,600MW ItaipG dam along
the Brazil-Paraguay border throughout the 1970s). Generation planning was demand-driven:
instead of building a plant for the full 3,000MW identified in the original inventories, this set
of studies called for two dams to be built in sequence, one for 432MW and a second one for
427MW and with a total capacity factor of 80% 7-enough capacity to meet projected
electricity needs. (INECEL, 1992) According to interviews with former INECEL officers and
contractors (interviewees no. 7, 14, 27; see appendix), the study was the first step toward
procurement for construction and management.
The original study is not publicly available, at least not officially. Copies of the 19-volume
work live on the bookshelves of former or current officers, at engineering firms once involved
with the project, or scattered around various university libraries in the country. For this thesis,
the author scanned a copy of the executive summary, which includes page-long descriptions
of each volume or "Anexo." It is worth highlighting the discussion of environmental impacts,
which briefly points to rapid urbanization and associated land use change around the site as
the biggest potential risk. The study calls for a minimum 'ecological' river flow, 56,8m3/s, the
"lowest level recorded" needed to conserve "the aesthetic beauty of the [San Rafael] waterfall
and avoid impacts on the local ecosystem." (INECEL, 1992: 2) The financial projections
estimate a total development cost of $907 million, including transmission lines, or
approximately $1 million per installed MW. The executive summary does not provide details
' The ratio of actual electricity output of a plant in a given period of time over potential output if the plant operated at full
capacity 100% of the time.
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on projected cash flows but nonetheless quotes net benefits of close to $960 million.
However, the public procurement process never started.
In 1992, the incoming government of Sixto Duren Ballen entered a debt renegotiation
process-$14 billion-with the International Monetary Fund that resulted in two aggressive
sets of reforms. Dur n Ballen's government first introduced a Modernization Law, designed to
privatize a number of state operations and liberate resources to honor rising external debt
obligations. By 1994, a total of ten state companies were privatized, worth $168 million.
(Villalba Andrade, 2011) In October 1996, barely three months after President Abdale Bucaram
took office, Ecuador passed the Leyde Regimen del SectorE/dctrico (LSRE), which would
unbundle INECEL and end the state monopoly over generation and distribution activities in
the sector, with the goal of sparking competitive supply of electricity in the country and
increasing the quality and affordability of services. INECEL's assets were now available to
private concessionaries, which could not control more than 51 % of the total system. LRSE also
established key government-run organizations to provide oversight in the sector, which
continue to play a role today: the National Council for Electricity (CONELEC), responsible for
the oversight of electricity markets in the country; the National Center for Energy Control
(CENACE), which oversees wholesale electricity transactions and operations and the
coordination of the entire transmission system; and Transelectric, sole manager of the
country's transmission network; among others.
To manage the privatization process, in 1998 the government created a holding entity, the
Fondo de Solidaridad (FS), which would become the largest shareholder in each utility and
would progressively sell off assets to private actors. In addition, the FS was to channel the
proceeds from these sales, as well as returns from its shares in the electricity sector, toward
the provision of public services in other sectors of the economy. (Fondo de Solidaridad del
Ecuador, 2002) In practice, the FS allowed the government to continue to have a majority
stake in most of INECEL's assets, which were private on paper but effectively state-owned. Full
transfer to private hands never took place.
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The LRSE also introduced marginal pricing theory to Ecuador. Under this scheme, CENACE, as
the independent system operator, must identify available electricity supply from all
generators connected to the national and prioritize the dispatch of energy from the source
with the lowest marginal cost at any given moment. CONELEC would establish referential
prices from which to estimate the cost of supply, and calculate additional charges before
setting end-user tariffs. Electricity markets would putatively provide economic incentives for
investors to develop new generation capacity and sell power to distribution companies and
large consumers (who are free to negotiate direct, long-term contracts with suppliers).
The ambiguity around institutional ownership, combined with the actual performance of
electricity markets, created a vicious circle. One of the main reasons the state kept its stake in
former INELEC assets was lack of efficiency and transparency in electricity transactions.
Distribution companies in Ecuador were notorious for the inability to collect tariffs, as result of
mismanagement, corruption, and theft; some of these companies have historically perceived
losses representing close to 25% of collected income. (CONELEC, 2008) Unpaid suppliers
would then refuse to settle their bills with Ecuador's national oil company, Petroecuador, for
the supply of fossil fuels for thermal generation. To this day, the Ecuadorian government
often has to absorb unpaid balances between distribution companies, CENACE, and
electricity suppliers. With respect to generation, the risk associated with free market
transactions provided little incentive for private investment, especially for projects like large
hydropower, which entail high upfront capital expenditures and take an average of five years
to build. In practice, the incentive was to reap the benefits from thermal plants that, given
fossil fuel price volatility, would spike up the marginal prices in the market.
Thus, far from boosting private participation in hydroelectric capacity and upgrades to
existing projects, the wave of reforms steadily increased the country's reliance on thermal
generation. As Villalba Andrade has shown (2011), hydropower's share in total electricity
production (measured in GW hours) decreased from close to 70% in 1996 to approximately
40% in 2006, a decade after the passing of the LSRE. Energy production from thermal plants-
mostly diesel-fired generation-grew from 32% to 47% in the same period. Curiously, a
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reliance on expensive thermal plants in a marginal pricing system occasionally produced high
returns for hydropower operators, who received as much as 10 cents per kWh for power that
cost them -3 cents/kWh to produce. (Muhoz Vizhhay, 2011) More alarmingly, almost 90% of
hydropower came from three plants: Hidropaute, Agoysn (156MW), and Pisayambo - Pucars
(74MW), all of which are located in the Amazonian watershed. Between 1992 and 1997,
during the dry months of November - March, Ecuadorians would repeatedly experience
electricity shortages. Tellingly, starting in 2000, underinvestment in generation would force
Ecuador continuously to import electricity from Colombia, its neighbor to the north. Between
1999 and 2006, imported power would grow from 0% to more than 10% of total electricity
consumed. Ecuador's energy mix increased in carbon intensity and became further exposed
to the risks of imported power, both with respect to fuel price volatility and uncertain supply
of electricity from Colombia.
Investment in electricity infrastructure would suffer from an even harder blow. In 1999,
Ecuador entered the worst financial crisis in its history, partially the result of the liberalization
measures started under Dur6n-Ballen's government and enshrined in a new Constitution
drafted in 1998. The General Law for Institutions in the Financial System significantly reduced
the oversight over banks, which grew careless, inefficient, and corrupt. (Villalba Andrade,
2011) Interest rates increased dramatically in order to boost capital flows, curb inflation, and
promote savings. Inconsistent fiscal policies further increased financial instability: in 1998, the
government abolished property taxes and replaced them with a new fee on capital flows,
which decreased total savings and further eroded confidence in local banking institutions. By
the end of the year, the government had to take ownership of more than 70% of all financial
institutions, which cost the country four billion dollars, or 20% of that year's GDP. (Martin-
Mayoral, 2009)
In 1999, President Jamil Mahuad took drastic measures, including the phasing of oil and gas
subsidies and further privatizations of public institutions. By 2000, Ecuador adopted the US
dollar as its official currency, which partially halted inflation. Politically, the country was in
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disarray. Between 1996 and 2005, Ecuador went through seemingly endless protests and
coups. In this period, the country had no fewer than seven presidents.
INELEC, before its dissolution, did manage to draft the decennial electricity master plan, the
Plan Maestro de Electrificacidn 1998 -2007, a multi-year projection of the country's energy
needs. The document is optimistic about the potential of the LSRE reforms and private
participation. It lays out a plan for gradual development of large hydropower projects,
including Marcel Laniado de Wind, a controversial addition to the multi-purpose dam Daule-
Peripa in the Pacific Watershed", and a new 230MW dam in the Amazonian province of
Pastaza, the San Francisco project (highly controversial as well, as will be shown later).
Given the lack of significant investments from the state in the country's generation portfolio,
energy authorities expected private investors to step in and secure power supplies for the
country. Thus, CCS features even more prominently in the 1998-2007 plan. Based on the 1992
feasibility studies, energy authorities hoped to grant concessions for the development for the
first phase, a total of 432MW, by October 2005, and an additional 427MW exactly two years
later. According to some accounts, Quito's electric utility and distribution company, EEQ,
obtained a concession from the water authority, the National Council for Hydric Resources
(CNHR), but the proposed consortium was later denied a power concession given a potential
conflict of interest between generation and distribution activities within EEQ. (Lopez, 2008)
Overall, plans for hydropower went largely unfulfilled. Private investors did not find enough
incentives to participate in projects like CCS, and development agencies like the IADB did not
deem this particular dam a worthy candidate for investment. By 2006, a decade after the
passing of LRSE, 1183MW were added to the country's portfolio. Only 18% (215MW) came
from state-sponsored hydropower, through the Marcel Laniado project. (Gerebizza, Manes, &
Dojmi, 2008; Salazar & Rudnick, 2008) The remaining capacity came from thermal plants and
imported power from Colombia.
' See Gerebizza et. al (2008) for a detailed account of the post-facto audit of Marcel Laniado de Wind.
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Setting the Stage for Megaproject Development
CONELEC's 2007-2016 Plan marks a significant shift in energy planning. It comes hand in hand
with a major regulatory and legislative overhaul, part of Correa's political platform. Below is a
brief overview of how his administration successfully re-centralized energy planning (as well
as other "strategic" sectors, such as oil, mining, water governance, and telecommunications),
while enacting notably progressive environmental and social laws. The contradictions
between these legislative efforts are testament to the unavoidable trade-off between
development objectives and social and environmental protection. In the case of Ecuador,
matters of "national security" and "sovereignty" often trump other considerations, as will be
shown in the following pages.
The preface to the 2007-2016 Master Plan condemns the experiences from the previous
decade-the so-called 'indicative planning,' through which entities like CONELEC utilize
electricity master plans to highlight growing energy needs and suggest potential generation
projects to private actors. The 2007-2016 Plan speaks of a "new development paradigm that
allows the State to take the initiative in the planning and execution of great infrastructure
projects (...) Emblematic actions of this new and revolutionary political approach include the
commitment of funds for the development of key hydropower projects: Mazar (160MW),
Sopladora (487MW), Toachi Pilat6n (253MW), Ocafia (26MW), as well as Coca Codo Sinclair."
(CONELEC, 2007)
The document conspicuously refers to two potential scenarios for CCS: the 1992, two-phased
development, and a new design option for a single project with 1,500MW. Chapter 6 focuses
on generation options for the country, from renewable sources like geothermal, solar, and
wind energy, to hydropower and thermal projects. This section devotes one page to Coca-
Codo-Sinclair; it mentions the 1992 studies and the original 432-427MW, two-phased
proposal and then briefly lists three factors to justify the increase to 1,500MW: "favorable
hydraulic conditions on the Coca river, rising electricity demand, and the high costs of other
supply sources." (CONELEC, 2007, p. 150) It acknowledges the need for an updated set of
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feasibility studies and final designs for the project. Similar to the 1992 studies, the Plan
recognizes the need for a minimum ecological flow, determined by the minimum flow
recorded until 1992: 56,8m3/s. The meaning of "ecological flow" is only alluded to: it is the
amount of water needed to make sure that the Coca river's San Rafael waterfall, located a few
kilometers downstream from the main dam, survives as more than a few drops of water.
This policy shift is emblematic of President Rafael Correa's administration, which has
governed since early 2007. Having originally served as Minister of Finance between 2005-
2007, Correa rose to power with a straightforward political message: markets do not govern,
states do. With this banner, Correa quickly instituted massive legislative and institutional
reform; his first action as president was the creation of a new Constitutional Assembly, which
drafted a new Constitution to replace the text from 1998. It passed a national referendum
with 63.2% approval. The 2008 Constitution is praised as one of the most forward-thinking
bodies of law, as much as it causes apprehension for the ways in which it expands the
Executive branch of government.
On the one hand, it introduces the concept of the "good life," el buen vivir, as its foundational
principle. The term finds its roots in the kichwa sumak kawsay, a belief espoused by
indigenous communities through South America's Andean region that encourages a
harmonious relationship with nature as well as social equality. As a political concept, it also
seeks to vindicate indigenous peoples and their resistance to Spanish colonization and post-
colonial marginalization. Legally, the concept acquires clearer meaning once juxtaposed with
some of the Constitution's more notable articles and clauses, especially with respect to
environmental regulation.
Article 1 establishes Ecuador as a rights-based nation; the state's first and foremost function is
to ensure and protect these rights. In practice, this means that no judicial norm or regulation
can limit these rights and courts will always judge accordingly. For example, since the
Constitution guarantees the right to prior consultation, the fact that Ecuador has not yet have
passed regulation on how consultation should proceed does not excuse individuals or
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entities from engaging in this process. Similarly, if two regulations stand in conflict with one
another, courts will judge in favor of the one that provides a broader, more expansive
interpretation of citizen rights.
Article 14 guarantees the right to a healthy environment and recognizes the public's interest
in the conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity, and Ecuador's genetic patrimony. Article 71,
one of the most notable sections, grants rights to nature, as it would to individuals or
collective entities:
Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for
its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and
evolutionary processes (...) The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities
and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an
ecosystem. (Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador, 2008)
Individuals and communities in Ecuador can appeal to the state whenever these rights are not
being observed. The Constitution spells out key criteria with respect to environmental
legislation, to be respected and ensured by the state: prevention, which calls for
environmental impact assessment and impact minimization; precaution, which prioritizes
caution in those case where impact is uncertain (e.g., genetically-modified organisms);
inviolability of legal actions; subsidiarity, which extends responsibility for environmental
impacts not simply to those directly implicated, but also to other stakeholders-including the
government, in the case of concessions to natural resources. Article 395 recognizes the
following environmental principles: 1) sustainable development, 2) the crosscutting nature of
environmental legislation, 3) active and permanent participation from citizens, and 4) the
requirement always to prioritize those laws that ensure and expand nature's rights. Precise
application of these rights and principles depend on secondary legislation and governmental
institutions capable of implementing them.
On the other hand, as critics have pointed out, the Constitution simultaneously expands the
citizenry's political demands while turning the state into the sole political entity capable of
responding to these demands. (Verdesoto & Ardaya, 2010) Specifically, the Constitution gives
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the Executive branch full control over fiscal policy (Arts. 135 and 301) and Ecuador's Central
Bank (Art. 303); authority to draft and implement planning and development objectives,
embodied in the National Development Plan (Art. 147) which is itself controlled by the
President (Art. 279); and the power to abolish the Legislative branch if and when it stands in
the way of the National Development Plan (Art. 148). (Calder6n, 2008; Martin-Mayoral, 2009)
Thus, the Constitution marks a clear departure from the framework established by the 1998
text, which much more clearly sought to create a balance of power between the three
branches of government.
In the energy sector, Article 313 also highlight this trend toward the centralization of power
and institutional capacities:
The State reserves the right to administer, regulate, monitor and manage strategic sectors,
following the principles of environmental sustainability, precaution, prevention and efficiency.
Strategic sectors, which come under the decision making and exclusive control of the State, are
those that, due to their importance and size, exert a decisive economic, social, political or
environmental impact and must be aimed at ensuring the full exercise of rights and the general
welfare of society.
The following are considered strategic sectors: energy in all its forms, telecommunications,
nonrenewable natural resources, oil and gas transport and refining, biodiversity and genetic
heritage, the radio spectrum, water and others as established by law. (The National Assembly of
Ecuador, 2008; emphasis added)
Secondary legislation was introduced to realize "exclusive control of the State" over
electricity. Also in 2008, Correa's administration introduced a new constitutional mandate, the
Mandato 15; notably, the institutional structure that was created to enable the liberalization
of the electricity sector remained the same and in fact allowed the government to establish
control across all activities. The FS, previously the main stakeholder in key enterprises across
all 'verticals' (generation, transmission, and distribution) transferred its properties to new
public companies.
Correa's administration created oversight institutions to govern across generation and
transmission activities. The state allocates monies for investments in generation, transmission,
and distribution (including electrification in rural areas) out of the country's general budget.
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To facilitate these transactions, in early 2009, the government founded the Electric
Corporation of Ecuador (CELEC), a holding company that owns and manages the largest
hydroelectric and thermal generation projects in the country: Hidropaute, Electroguayas,
Termoesmeraldas, and Hidroagoy6n (which represent a combined capacity of 1.94GW), along
with transmission company Transelectric. Termopichincha, a Quito-based thermal plant
operator, also came under the CELEC umbrella; it is a noteworthy player who, as will be
discussed below, was also involved in the development of CCS.
Sales of electricity take place through 20 geographically distinct, concession areas, where
majority publicly-owned distributors operate. CELEC manages 10 of these areas, which serve
over 1.3 million customers (36% of total), with comparatively bad indicators for losses (20% in
2008, technical and non-technical) and collection. (CONELEC, 2008; The Inter-American
Development Bank, 2010) The remaining 1.7 million customers (46%) source power from 10
companies, including those that serve large urban centers: Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca.
The Mandato 15 abolished marginal pricing in electricity markets and eliminated a number of
surcharges previously applied to all consumers in order to finance some of the State's
investments in transmission maintenance and expansion. Instead, the government granted
countrywide tariff-setting powers to CONELEC and has since guaranteed the provision of
subsidies whenever the costs of generation, distribution, and transmission exceed the tariffs
charged to final users. (Arts. 1 and 2 of Mandato 15)
Perhaps the most significant structural change was the dismantling of the Ministry of Energy
and Mines. Traditionally, the Ministry oversaw all energy-related activities in the country,
ranging from oil exploration and extraction to electricity supply and regulation. In early 2010,
the Correa administration created a stand-alone Ministry of Energy to govern over the oil and
extractive sectors, while creating a brand new institution in charge of electricity: the Ministry
of Electricity and Renewable Energies (MEER). Politically, the separation enables a monopoly
over the oil and gas sector-and ready access to income from crude exports-while creating
an institutional mechanism to boost governmental investments in electricity. However, this
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model is not without risk, as the different actors in the electric power sector rely on what are
essentially cross-sectorial subsidies for its long-term operations, instead of relying on
revenues from its own distribution activities.
An equally seismic reform, this time with regard to environmental legislation, came in late
2007, when Correa issued Executive Decree 655: it gave primacy to "priority projects in
electricity, as determined by CONELEC's board" over state-protected conservation areas.
(Presidencia de la Rep~blica del Ecuador, 2007) While Decree 655 still recognized the need for
an environmental impact assessment and approval from the Ministry of Environment, it
effectively freed CONELEC's priority projects from environmental restrictions.
In 2008, shortly after its creation, the MEER published a 200-page report on the future of
energy in the country. Coca-Codo-Sinclair is briefly mentioned, yet it plays a central role in the
Ministry's vision for "energy sovereignty" and a clean and efficient generation portfolio. The
document considers two scenarios: a baseline that combines trends in capacity additions with
new projects that had begun construction. The second scenario-aptly referred to as "select
scenario"-assumes the incorporation of CCS to Ecuador's system around 2015 (Fig. 20
below, copied from the MEER 2008 Report). The benefits, according to the text, are clear: cost
savings through displacement of diesel-fueled thermal plants, the potential for power exports
to Colombia and PerO during the rainy seasons, and tariff reductions for end-users. Moreover,
the report speaks explicitly of the need to curb greenhouse gas emissions and praises
hydroelectricity for its capacity to achieve multiple goals in one sweep.
MEER's and CONELEC's texts on the future of energy planning in Ecuador were not just
optimistic, but strongly prescriptive. Sections on non-traditional renewables like solar and
geothermal generation cite Ecuador's potential for future development, especially for rural
electrification projects, but are otherwise vague with respect to specific plans and goals.
Regardless of how little information these documents provide in terms of the project's history
or potential impacts, positive and negative, CCS appears as a paradigmatic solution to meet
electricity demands as well as an emblematic example of state-led development.
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Figure 20. MEER's scenarios for electricity production and hydropower generation. From MEER, 2008
The main difference between the top and the bottom rows is the introduction of CCS into the country's grid by 2014.
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Crisis and Response: The Return of Coca-Codo-Sinclair
From 2009 on, CCS emerge as the single most important "priority" energy project in the
country. Correa's administration accordingly took on the project with urgency, often citing
reasons of national security and sovereignty to justify hastened decision on the project. As
this section will show, Correa applied a form of exceptionalism to this project, resorting to
special legal figures and procedures to overcome financing difficulties, as well as irregularities
in environmental licensing and actual construction. With CCS, the state pushed for energy
sovereignty at the expense of established impact and procurement processes.
In March 2008, CONELEC's Board granted a concession to develop the 1,500MW project to
COCASINCLAIR S.A., a joint venture between Ecuador's Termopichincha and Argentina's
ENERSA, a majority publicly-owned distribution firm and retail energy provider. The
agreement called for a 70-30% participation, respectively, for a total $1 .6 billion. It took
CONELEC a little over a month to approve COCASINCLAIR's feasibility studies and preliminary
environmental impact assessment. In late April, following a visit from Argentinian President
Cristina Fern6ndez de Kirchner, President Correa traveled to the small town of Sim6n Bolivar
to deliver CCS' inauguration speech:
Nothing can stop us in our decision to exercise Energy Sovereignty, which means nothing more
than the use of the authority granted to us by the people to make decisions that will provide them
with economic and social benefits (...) We will reduce generation costs by an average of 50%. We
will reduce the use of fossil fuels, thus cutting down indirect subsidies to private generators. By
2013, this project will provide 63% of total power and energy demand (...) We will stop
consuming 17 million barrels of oil, which, at an average per barrel cost of $80, will save us $1.36
billion dollars per year. (Correa Delgado, 2008)
This quote is especially eloquent. It outlines all the political and economic justifications that
would eventually excuse a number of procedural irregularities: sovereignty, cost savings,
equity (note the combative reference to "private generators"), and a dirigiste approach to
energy planning.
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In the past four years, with the advent of CCS, the landscape of large hydropower in Ecuador
has changed. The Ecuadorian government has not vacillated in its push to develop priority
projects, seeking alternative financing options and creating special legal procedures, such as
the procurement process for CCS, to ensure prompt delivery of projects. CCS is one among all
the priority hydropower projects that Correa's administration has promised to complete.
Below are a few additional examples:
e The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) financed over 70% of the $338 million San
Francisco project, part of the Agoysn dam complex. In 2008, a year after it went into
operation, the plant had to be shut down due to construction flaws. The government sued
Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht and immediately seized its hydropower assets in
the country, including Baba (part of the Marcel Laniado de Wind project, mentioned
above) and Toachi Pilat6n.
e Toachi Pilat6n (253MW) began construction in 2011 in northeastern Ecuador, not far
from the CCS site. The country's national pension fund, lESS, bankrolled 48% of the $520
million project. The Ministry of Finance provided 28% of total and the remaining $123
million came as a loan from Russia's Exim Bank. Construction of the civil works was
awarded to Chinese firm International Water and Electric. Russia's RAO will be in charge of
the electromechanical contract. Even though the project had already secured 100%
financing-thus failing the 'additionality' test-it was submitted for consideration under
the UNFCCC's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A local non-governmental
organization associated with International Rivers, the Fundaci6n Rio Napo (FRN), attached
comments to these submissions, echoing some of the same issues related to CCS:
(...) there is some question about the ability of the Toachi-Pilat6n Hydroelectric
Project to maintain its installed capacity of 253 MW. The project was originally
proposed as a 190 MW project, then increased to a 228 MW project, and now a 253
MW project. However, based on the average annual generation of 1090 GWh/year
reported, this amounts to an efficiency factor on the order of 0.49, which is quite low,
and what would be expected, and what is typically observed, from the existing run-of-
river projects in Ecuador which have little or no reservoir capacity, and that have been
designed based on median monthly or median annual flow statistics. (UNFCCC, 2006)
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* Quijos (100MW), located in south-central Ecuador, in the Amazonian watershed, is still
under negotiation. Quito's main utility, EEQ, which, as noted above, was once attached to
the CCS project, is the main concessionary. Iran's Export Development Bank EDBI has
pledged to fund up to 60% of the project.
e The Minas-San Francisco (275MW) project, located near the Hidropaute complex, is
being financed and built by Chinese firm Harbin. The project is already under
construction. It was nonetheless submitted for consideration under the UNFCCC's CDM;
given that funds have already been committed, the plant is unlikely to pass the
additionality test.
The Mazar (160MW), Sopladora (487MW), Ocaha (26MW), Chontal (190MW) and other large-
scale projects tell of similar stories to that of CCS.
According to records gathered by L6pez (2008), a private contractor, FOPECA, began
construction of an access road near the CCS site without carrying out any kind of
environmental impact assessment or public consultation process with local towns and
communities. Congressman Le6n Rold6s Aguilera promptly presented a suit against
COCASINCLAIR, arguing irregularities with regard to the procedures guiding the concession
as well as questioning ENERSA's capacity to coordinate a generation project. (Brito Grandes,
2008) Local protests against FOPECA followed shortly thereafter.
2009 was a decisive year for Correa and his energy agenda. Yet again, the Amazonian
watershed went through a dry season, which led to severe electricity shortages. Esteban
Albornoz, Minister of Electricity and Renewable Energies at the time, reacted by quickly
expanding Ecuador's thermal plant portfolio (-500MW) and upgrading existing plants, which
was too little too late. By the end of 2009, he was forced to resign. Correa's administration
utilized the crisis to galvanized political and financial support for CCS and the projects
originally mentioned in the 2007 Plan.
Correa's call for energy sovereignty translated into very specific mandates for MEER and
Conelec, and these authorities have consistently referred to the administration's discourse to
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justify their decisions. First, the country must minimize the need for imported power. Second,
in order to achieve this, CONELEC has set the following goals for its generation portfolio: to
guarantee at least 10% energy reserves and 12% power reserves. The amount of energy
produced, measured in energy output per hour, as mentioned above, depends on water and
fuel availability. The amount of power depends on the actual capacity installed. In addition,
CONELEC have a clear hierarchy of selection criteria for potential projects: first, their potential
contribution toward energy output; second, the project's potential contribution toward total
generation capacity. These criteria depend on the project's technical feasibility, its economic
attractiveness, and the related social and environmental costs.
To measure economic attractiveness, CONELEC considers two metrics: the levelised cost of
energy, or the cost incurred to generate a unit of electricity, including capital, return on
investment, operations, and fuel; and the cost of power, which is effectively the cost
associated with keeping the reserves available in case all plants must meet demand.
According to CONELEC officials, there is but a single way to measure the social and
environmental attractiveness of a project: through an environmental impact assessment,
which is both required and approved by CONELEC itself. CCS scored high on the most
relevant among these criteria. With a capacity factor of 0.68, its projected levelised cost is 4
cents/kWh and its power costs are $1,784/kW. The government found no reason not to move
full steam ahead. (The EIA, published post-facto in 2009, did not highlight major issues, as will
be discussed below.)
Also in 2009, ENERSA-and the Argentinian government, by extension-pulled out of CCS,
purportedly due to lack of funds. (El Universo, 2009) The company's stakes were transferred
over to the recently-created CELEC. Politically, energy authorities could not defend further
delays for what had already been heralded as the solution to the country's electricity needs.
Not long after ENERSA's departure, the Coordination Ministry for Strategic Sectors initiated a
special, international bidding process for the construction of the hydro plant. Ecuador has
very strict public procurement procedures, also the result of the sweeping regulatory reforms
in place since Correa first rose to power. Bidding for infrastructure projects is usually emphatic
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about participation from local firms and local labor, i.e., in line with Correa's push for
sovereignty and local economic development. In the case of CCS, however, bids would not be
accepted unless participants presented a financing proposal. (Redacci6n El Comercio, 2011)
Given that not even the government could fully finance the CCS project, this effectively
barred local companies from participating, a fact that has often been criticized even by
domestic supporters of CCS.
According to interviewees from private contracting firms and representatives from local
government (interviewees no. 7,26, 37), negotiations with the eventual winner of the bidding
process, China's Sinohydro, had begun well in advance of the selection. Shortly after ENERSA's
departure, by late 2008, Correa's administration announced that the government was in
negotiations to obtain a loan from China's Export-import Bank (Exim Bank). The process was
not without hiccups; Chinese partners offered to finance 85% of the project with a loan that
originally required state guarantees, which Correa's administration could not agree with.
In early 2009, the bidding process for the construction of CCS finally began. Only two
companies presented their application: Sinohydro (developers of the world's largest
hydropower project, China's Three Gorges Dam) and another Chinese developer, Gezhouba.
While their bids have not been made public, reports confirm that both companies offered to
finance up to 85% of the project-a strong suggestion that their bids had governmental
backing and might be tied to Exim Bank monies. However, Ghezouba's bid was disqualified
because it was deemed incomplete. (Redacci6n El Universo, 2009) By mid-2009, the Ministry
for Strategic Sectors, to which MEER partially reports to, had signed a memorandum of
understanding with Sinohydro; this agreement implied that there would have to be further
negotiations with respect to actual construction and implementation costs, since, as is
evident, neither INELEC, CONELEC, nor Termopichincha ever moved beyond the 1992
feasibility studies. In other words, it was understood that the winning bidder effectively had
to start from scratch, a very unorthodox approach for a large hydropower project as
prominent as CCS. But expediency was key: the state would no longer risk another round of
electricity shortages and its potential negative political impacts on his administration.
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As discussed earlier, Termopichincha came under full control of CELEC in 2010. Its remaining
70% stake in CCS went to the state, which turned COCASINCLAIR into a stand-alone public
company, Empresa Hidroelectrica Coca Codo Sinclair E.P. Then, a year after the agreement
with Sinohydro, Ecuador and the Exim Bank agreed to terms for a 15-year, 6.9% interest, $1.7
billion loan. (Hall, 2010) Ecuador would either find sponsors or fund the remaining 15% from
its own coffers. By late 2010, the Correa administration had secured partners for financing and
construction, not to mention a loud political message calling for energy sovereignty and a
vow never again to suffer from electricity shortages.
When CONELEC first made explicit mention of CCS the 2007 Plan, CCS had been dormant for
more than 30 years. Despite continuous misadventures, CELEC, CONELEC, MEER, and Correa
himself, took merely three years to materialize the idea for a 1,500MW. Today, construction is
well underway. While Sinohydro may yet experience delays characteristic of infrastructure
megaprojects-especially given the technical difficulties that may rise from building an
underground tunnel in unstudied geological condition-CCS is expected to inject power into
the grid by 2016.
Procedural irregularities plague the CCS project. There was effectively no bidding contest, i.e.,
no way to know whether or not the government picked the lowest cost, lowest impact option
for construction. Final designs, both for the infrastructure project as well as for financing,
would come post-facto. Moreover, once Sinohydro took on construction duties from the
original contractors, FOPECA, Coca Codo Sinclair E.P. launched yet another procurement
process for oversight and implementation, in a contract worth over $72 million. The
institutional structure is unusual-a contractor for construction and a contractor for
oversight-which points to the need for coordination among a larger set of players,
presumably to placate domestic energy contractors that were excluded from the project.
Four companies, two from Ecuador and two from Mexico, won the contract to supervise and
implement construction. (Padilla, 2011) A visit to the construction site in January 2012
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revealed that subcontractors are currently carrying out much of the construction. Some of
these firms, such as Ecuador's Sacoto Constructores, have filed complaints against Coca Codo
Sinclair E.P. for unfair labor conditions. Specifically, the suit argues that Sinohydro is paid
400% more than local contractors for their labor, on a per-square meter basis. (Redacci6n El
Hoy, 2012) Beyond the particular arguments of the case, quarrels between contractors reveal
a glaring contradiction between Correa's labor policies and actual infrastructure work. In
2008, his administration introduced the Constitutional Mandate No. 8, which explicitly
outlaws sub-contracting in the country. On this basis, Coca Codo Sinclair E.P. should not allow
Sinohydro to contract out its operations, let alone to do so without observing basic labor
standards.
Correa's administration has continuously strengthened ties with China-at the expense of
established process. CCS is but one among large-scale infrastructure projects that involve
Chinese participation. There is mutual gain. Correa has alienated multi-lateral organizations
like the World Bank (even expelling some its representatives in the country) as well as the
United States. China has stepped in their absence, providing much needed financial and
technical resources to fuel Correa's development agenda. In return, China has secured access
to natural resources in the region; it has even accepted to take billions of oil barrels as
payment for infrastructure loans. In short, Ecuador's reasons to accommodate Chinese
operations in the country respond to a more comprehensive geopolitical strategy, typical of
south-south development ventures.
The CCS site has peculiar environmental and social characteristics, due in large part to the
urbanization patterns that have taken place since oil was first discovered in 1967 in
northeastern Ecuador. The town of Lago Agrio, located a 2-3 hour drive north from CCS's
main dam, is the region's main outpost for oil operations. It is also the hub from which, since
the 1970s, Ecuador's main pipeline delivers crude from the Amazon region to the refineries
and ports on the Western coast. This pipeline, which connects Lago Agrio to Quito and
beyond, "snakes alongside each major road, elevated on stilts, waist high, like an endless
banister." (Keefe, 2012) Forest has been cleared all around, laying evidence for how oil
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exploration has marked colonization patterns in the region and along the main roads. The
buffer zone around CCS comprises sparse, mostly poor highway towns such as El Chaco,
Lumbaqui, and Manuel Galindo, whose populations' income traditionally depend on the oil
services industry, as well as tourism to its many rivers and, above all, the San Rafael waterfall.
As they approach the Andes Mountains to the West, these settlements-which, according to
COCASINCLAIR documents, have a population of approximately 6,200-creep up otherwise
the pristine slopes of the Cayambe-Coca national park.
Both road and pipeline run in parallel to the north of the Coca River up to where the water
'bends'-the codo or elbow. At this point, the River veers south, corralling a vast area of
forests that eventually become the Sumaco National Park. The topography has thus protected
the lands south of the Coca River from the waves of settlement associated with oil exploration
and timber extraction. The proposed designs for CCS will change this dynamic permanently,
since the construction of the reservoir calls for a road that leads directly to the heart of the
lands south of the River. Speculation and litigation for the ownership of these lands has
already begun, according to officers from the townships of El Chaco and Lumbaqui.
Dams with large reservoirs are usually contested on two grounds: the potential for the
displacement of large numbers of people, and ecosystem destruction, the result of floods as
well as changes to the river's natural flows and cycles. In the case of CCS, the expansion of the
urban frontier south of the Coca River will not displace communities living in the area, which
is an argument in favor of the project. Notably, official documents report that the reservoir
will contain over one billion m3 of water. Yet, not a single report specifies the expected forest
area to be cleared and flooded.
In the areas north of the Coca River, construction has put considerable pressure on the
region's infrastructure and basic services. According to city officers from El Chaco, Sinohydro
and its subcontractors have substandard waste management practices. Trash from the
workers' lunch litters the road; rocks continuously fall from cargo trucks running to and fro
the tunnel construction site; Sinohydro's basecamp continues to grow by the highway,
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without planning logic or basic infrastructure. The Chinese constructors have agreed to pay El
Chaco's waste management trucks to travel the extra miles down to the various camps and
sites, but subcontractors-who, as mentioned, have themselves claimed they are not
receiving fair pay-do not pay for any kind of basic service. One official said that a lot of what
is currently happening reminds him of the dynamics of oil exploration; large infrastructure
attracts unprecedented numbers of migrants as much as it draws from local labor force.
However, in contrast to oil services, the population knows that once CCS is completed,
employment opportunities will suddenly vanish but that the settlements will remain.
As a priority project protected by Executive Decree 665, CCS has run contrary to many of the
government's own requirements for land use planning. Each Municipality is required by law
to submit a territorial and land use plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial) to the national
planning agency, SENPLADES. CCS overrode many of these towns' plans; to finish their
documents, Coca Codo Sinclair E.P. was asked to share its plans for the project's buffer zone.
Officers in Lumbaqui shared these documents for this thesis. They are astonishingly vague.
Municipalities are concerned that SENPLADES will not approve their 2012-2013 Plans.
The scope of the 2009 EIA did not include the transmission lines or access roads, which,
according to local regulations, require stand-alone studies. As mentioned above, construction
on access roads began in 2008 without an EIA. With regard to transmission, Transelectric
expects the lines connecting CCS with the Inga substation, east of Quito, to be the first among
a series of 500kv lines-a significant upgrading to the country's 230/138kv system. According
to Transelectric's most recent Expansion Plan (2012), during the first expansion phase,
transmission lines from CCS will cover approximately 200km at a total cost of over $400
million. Further expansions (230kv) to distribution systems in the south will cover 70km, at a
cost of $30 million. (Transelectric, 2012) These lines will operate by 2015 and 2020,
respectively. The document makes no mention of environmental impact assessments but it
does highlight that studies for new 500kv lines were conducted with technical and financial
assistance from the IADB. The contractor in charge of these studies was Guayaquil-based
Efficacitas-the same company that completed the EIA for the CCS project in 2009.
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Coca River (
Salado and Power
Station
Intake Dam
Image 1. Base Camp - First access point to the CCS' power house.'
9 All photos by P. Zambrano-Barrag~n (2012).
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Image 2. Visitor Center near El Reventador
Image 3. The San Rafael Waterfall.
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Image 4. Sinohydro basecamp
Image 5. Confluence of the Quijos and Salados rivers. Main dam construction site.
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Image 6. Tunnel construction site on the Quijos/Salado rivers.
Multi-lateral development agencies never considered providing financing for either the
original Termopichincha-sponsored project, or for the remaining 15% stake after Exim Bank
extended its loan. These agencies, according to interviews with officers from the Inter-
American Development Bank, as well as CONELEC (interviewees no. 13, 15, 20, 27), were
disenchanted with the many procedural irregularities since CCS' revival in 2008, especially
regarding the lack of updated feasibility studies, design options, and social and
environmental impact analyses.
Current debates about the Coca's ecological flow illustrate this point very clearly. The 1992
studies, which analyzed water flow data since the late 1970s, called for a minimum flow of
53m 3/s. This is the median minimum monthly recorded in that period, and thus, using crude
logic, the minimum needed to ensure enough water would reach the San Rafael waterfall.
CONELEC's 2007 Plan referred to this number once again. However, by 2008, COCASINCLAIR
simply quoted the minimum flow needed to produce electricity. The 2009 Environmental
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Impact Assessment, commissioned by COCASINCLAIR, does recognize the need for an
ecological flow, but does not quote a specific number. According to CONELEC officials, the
unofficial number will likely be approximately 28m3/s, but, without official estimates, it is not
possible either to confirm or question this figure.
Numerous civil society organizations, including local tourist agencies who host rafting tours
on these same rivers, argue that without updated studies on actual water flows, this number
is arbitrary and potentially deadly for the river. Agencies like International Rivers point to the
experience of the Agoydn Project (156MW), built in 1987 200km south of CCS. The plant on
the Pastaza River has effectively dried up the Agoydn Waterfall, further downstream. What
worries these critics is that, in recent years, global warming has had impacts on rainfall
patterns, a fact that cast doubts on the reliability of the water measurements used for CCS.
Some organizations believe the average flow is closer to 80-100 m3/s; the plant will operate
considerably below capacity and that the need for electricity will force operators to go below
even the minimum of 28m 3/s. (Caselli, 2011)
CCS is an exceptional project, and not just in terms of its scale. It illustrates how the state can
effectively overrule principles and processes, or re-draw them for objectives like sovereignty
or security of supply. It is reasonable to expect governments to balance competing goals in
their development paths. However, the moment Correa's administration designated CCS as a
priority project, it ruled out a consideration of alternatives. As part of an overriding
geopolitical strategy that involves south-south cooperation with governments such as China
and Brazil, the government must mediate between a set of multi-scalar interests, i.e., it must
simultaneously broker and negotiate with partners, while also providing oversight for their
activities. In the absence of safeguards vis-h-vis south-south ventures, it must also mediate
between partner governments and local communities and authorities. The project reveals
clear contradictions in territorial governance. The state found compelling political reasons to
ignore some of the environmental laws it itself drafted in the Constitution, revealing one way
to solve potential conflicts around contested energy project: a top-down, executive setting of
priorities and ad-hoc procedures.
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Figure 21. Official Coca Codo Sinclair E.P. map highlighting the project's "direct" impact areas (in red).
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Chapter 3. Regional Perspectives. Chile's HidroAysen and Peru's
Inambari Projects
"Big dams account for 10 percent of our portfolio but 95 percent of our headaches"
John Briscoe, Former Senior Water Advisor to The World Bank
Ecuador's CCS highlights important trends in the development of large hydropower in South
America: the difficulty in accurately assessing the benefits and pitfalls of hydroelectric plants
vis-h-vis other energy projects; the shifting role of multilateral sources of financing and the
new prominence of alternative, bi-national agreements; governance challenges that arise
from the overlap of territories destined for environmental conservation and basins with great
potential for hydropower development; and new political debates about how best to deal
with the risks of global warming. To help explain how different states across the region face
this common set of issues, this chapter provides an overview of two recent visible cases:
PerO's Inambari dam and Chile's HidroAysen project.
With a projected installed capacity of 2,000MW, Inambari is but one among a network of
hydropower plants expected to be financed and built by the Brazilian government, and
private construction partners, in Pero's Amazon region. Up to 80% of electricity produced
from these dams would supply energy exclusively to the Brazilian system, thus offering a
contrasting case to that of CCS, i.e., energy megaprojects justified not as a way to displace
fossil-fired plants or increase local generation capacity, but to ensure regional infrastructural
integration and, presumably, to reap economic benefits from the international sale of power.
The Camisea fields in Southern PerU represent one of the regions largest reserves for natural
gas. President Ollanta Humala has made it a priority to maximize the export of primary energy
goods and to create a petrochemical complex in southern Pero, anchored by Camisea.
Plentiful gas reserves diminish the short-term incentive to develop hydropower as an
alternative to fossil-fired plants. However, energy authorities in Per6 acknowledge the need
to increase hydropower generation capacity in the long-run. Cooperation with Brazilian
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partners may ensure the development of hydropower for future consumption while enjoying
the economic benefits of cheap, gas-fired power. However, there are currently no clear
economic, environmental, or social analyses of potential impacts and negative effects of
hydropower for export.
Chile's HidroAysen project consists of five dams on the Baker and Pascua rivers in a remote
section of the Patagonia, more than 2,000km south of the country's main transmission
network near the capital, Santiago. At 2,750MW, HidroAysen will be the largest hydropower
project in the country as well as one of the biggest power plants in Chile's entire generation
portfolio. As described in Chapter 1, Chile's electricity sector is unbundled horizontally; unlike
Ecuador's system, generation and supply are determined through competitive private
markets and the state keeps an active, regulatory role only in the transmission and
distribution of energy, setting prices for network access and minimum investment targets.
There is, however, vertical integration, i.e., private companies can simultaneously own
generation, transmission, and distribution assets; indeed, a handful of companies own a
considerable portion of the country's electricity system.
The debate around HidroAysen has evinced the limitations of Chile's electricity planning
framework. The country's overreliance on imported fuels make hydropower an especially
attractive option, for both security and cost-minimization reasons. However, the plant is
located in Chile's southern provinces, where there is a remarkable confluence of indigenous
territories and areas designated for environmental conservation. The need to build an
extensive transmission network to dispatch HidroAysen's power to load centers up north has
sparked unprecedented public debates about the government's role in the planning and
development of energy infrastructure. Controversies around the expropriation of lands and
distribution of benefits along the sites of the transmission line have resulted in a highly visible
and divisive legal battle over territorial planning and environmental licensing processes
between the project's sponsors-some of the country's key energy utilities-and
communities in the Patagonia and a number of civil society organizations. Moreover,
HidroAysen started an active discussion in Chile about which generation technologies and
88
The Role of the State in Large-Scale Hydropower Developrent
the type of investments needed to meet the country's future energy needs. Chile's electricity
sector presents notable differences from Ecuador's and, to a lesser extent, Pero's. Yet,
HidroAysen has faced similar controversies and criticisms, thus offering an important
opportunity to analyze the development of hydropower in competitive electricity markets.
Alternatives to Hydropower
What are the main factors that define a universe of alternatives for Ecuador, Pero, and Chile?
Since the WCD issued its recommendations for dam development, many governments and
project developers have recognized the need for "comprehensive and participatory
assessment of the full range of available policy, institutional, and technical options." (WCD,
2000: 221) Yet, the universe of alternatives is limited by a number of factors. In some cases,
like Chile, resource availability may considerably limit power generation options. Ecuador, a
country with a smaller economy, may find it too expensive to deploy costlier renewable
technologies; Pero, flush with natural gas reserves, may completely lack economic incentives.
Thus, state-defined political imperatives, such as energy sovereignty, or geopolitical
considerations, including the need to strengthen ties with trade partners (China and Brazil, or
even fellow OECD members, in the case of Chile), strongly inform the state's evaluation of
alternatives. As the cases of Pero and Chile confirm, choosing large hydropower over other
options invariably leads to conflict, thus requiring the state to mediate and ultimately resolve
competing interests vis-A-vis development pathways.
In late 2007, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) issued an 80-page report
titled "Elaboration of Executive Summaries for Hydroelectric Plants with Potential for Export
to Brazil." The report offers a quick overview of 15 different potential hydropower projects,
located throughout Eastern Pero, still in different stages of pre-construction study. Together,
the 15 projects represent 19,285MW-almost as much as Ecuador's entire hydropower
technically-feasible potential.
Table 4. Portfolio of 15 potential projects for energy export to Brazil. From MEM, 2007.
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Project Projected Capacity (MW)
Pongo de Manseriche 7,550
Cumba4 825
Chadin 2 600
La Balsa 915
Chaglla 444
Rentema 1,525
La Guitarra 220
Man 270 286
Sumabeni 1,074
Pakitzapango 1,379
Tambo-Pto. Prado 620
Vizcatan 750
Cuquipampa 800
Ina 200 1,355
Urub 320 942
Total 19,285
The document was written specifically for Brazil to consider future development of large
hydropower in Peruvian territory. It represents a landmark moment in discussions that began
in late 2006 between the two countries' energy ministries and eventually led to the signing, in
mid-2010, of a special bi-national agreement for energy "integration" between Brazil's then-
President Luiz Inazio "Lula" da Silva and his Peruvian counterpart Alan Garcia.
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Figure 23. Map included in the MEM's 2007 hydropower-for-export study. From M EM, 2007.
The document refers to Inambari as INA 200 and, noticeably, lists its potential capacity at 1,355MW. "CH"
stands for central hidroelictrica, hydropower plant.
UBICACON DE PROYECTOS DE CENTRALES HIDROELECTRICAS
DE LA VERTIENTE DEL ATLANTICO
The "Executive Summaries" report laid the groundwork for negotiations that focused on the
following key issues:
- Establish a legal framework to develop new hydropower and transmission projects in
PerO. The final 2010 agreement-available for download from MEM's official
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website1 --requires all projects to undergo full technical, feasibility, economic, social
and environmental feasibility studies and to respect local "sustainable development"
principles and regulations.
* Set a maximum capacity for development. While the 2007 report presented a portfolio
of options that added up to almost 20,000MW, the Peruvian government capped
projected capacity at 6,000MW. Brazil would eventually agree to this figure plus a 20%
margin-a total 7,200MW.
* Assign financial responsibility for the cost of transmission infrastructure. Brazil is
expected to underwrite grid connection to the new hydro plants across its border,
while Pero will pay for the lines needed to connect the projects to the Peruvian
system.
e Set the length of the contract for the dispatch and sale of energy to the Brazilian
market. The final period was set at 30 years, during which installed and effective
capacity will remain fixed. Though the final document does not specify the breakdown
of electricity sales across the two national markets, previous memoranda of
understanding use an 80-20% Brazil-PerO split as reference.
The agreement does not explicitly mention the plants that will be built. However, in the years
that followed, five projects have emerged, in numerous documents issued by PerU's MEM, as
the likely candidates to meet the 6,000-7,200MW capacity target. (Fig. 24) Two projects,
Inambari (2,000MW) and Pakitzapango (2,200MW), represent close to 60% of the total
capacity for export to Brazil.
0 http://www.minem.qob.pe/descripcion.phpidSector=6&idTituIar=3052
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Figure 24. The five proposed projects for power export to Brazil. From DAR, 2011.
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Inambari, located on the boundary between the three southeastern provinces of Cusco, Puno,
and Madre de Dios, 300 km from the Brazil border, is the farthest along on the way toward
actual development. Pre-feasibility studies and socialization of a potential project with local
communities began as early as 2007. In mid 2008, EGASUR, S.A., a consortium composed of
Brazilian private construction giant OAS and the majority publicly-owned Furnas, Eletrobras'
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generation subsidiary, received the standard two year "temporary concession," a period
during which private companies can complete impact and feasibility studies and obtain final
social and environmental licenses. (BICUSA, 2010; Serra Vega, 2010) However, by 2011, Pero
Vice-Minister of Energy, Luis Gonzales Talledo, revoked the temporary concession and
indefinitely postponed the project. (Aguirre, 2011)
At a total cost of US$4.9 billion, Inambari designs currently call for a 410km2 reservoir, which,
according the MINEM, would flood some 45,000 hectares of forest and cover a 100km stretch
of the Inter-Oceanic Highway, also built by Brazil through a cooperation agreement with Pero.
Large reservoirs are almost always necessary in the Amazon region, where rivers run through
flat topographies. Energy authorities in Pero often categorize hydroelectric sites in the
Atlantic watershed-PerO's equivalent to Ecuador's Amazonian watershed, east of the Andes
Mountains-according to height above sea level. Projects above 1,000 meters (-3,300 feet)
tend to be smaller in size and take advantage of natural topographic river fall; when and if
they require reservoirs, these are small and designed solely for electricity generation, though
occasionally also for flood control.
According to interviews with officials from the Inter-American Development Bank's Pero
office (interviewees no. 10, 15), high-elevation projects of Inambari's size would be
significantly more expensive to develop than if built in the Amazon region-a 3-1 price
difference-making small hydropower preferable when closer to the Andes. The impacts and
costs associated with larger reservoirs in low-elevation areas are often central to opposition
from local communities and conservation organizations. Many critics call for a more
comprehensive assessment of hydropower potential above 1,000 meters, as well as on the
basins west of the Andes Mountains, where there could be comparatively smaller impacts.
(DAR, 2011 b; Herrera Descalzi, 2009)
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Table 5. Comparative Flood Area Metrics for Latin American Hydropower. From MINEM - IADB, 2012
Capacity Reservoir People Displaced per
Project (Country) (MW) (has) displaced MW Ha/MW
Salvajina (Colombia) 270 2,030 3,272 12 7.52
ltaipu (Brazil/Paraguay) 12,600 135,000 59,000 5 10.71
Kararao/Belo Monte (Brazil) 8,381 116,000 n.a. n.a. 13.84
Betania (Colombia) 510 7,370 544 1 14.45
Inambari (Perdj; planned) 2,200 45,000 15,000 7 20.45
Urra I (Colombia) 340 7,400 6,200 18 21.76
El Cajon (Honduras) 300 11,200 4,000 13 37.33
lhla Soltera (Brazil) 3,200 125,700 6,150 2 39.28
Guri Complex (Venezuela) 10,300 426,000 1,500 <1 41.36
Average ha/mw 23.28
In terms of generation costs, the project's latest feasibility studies are not publicly available;
however, combining figures from the Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo and from a
report published by Lima-based environmental organization PRONATURALEZA, generation
costs from Inambari would range from $52/MWh to $65/MWh. (Serra Vega, 2010; Wiziack,
2012) These figures have important implications. Even at an average of $58/MWh, power from
Inambari would not be competitive in the Peruvian free market, where large customers
source electricity directly from generators and through long-term contracts with distribution
companies; as of 2009, average energy price in this market, according to a study carried out
by the World Bank, was $44.5/MWh, in large part due to the availability of cheap natural gas
for domestic use. (WB - ESMAP, 2010) Moreover, according to a recent study by MINEM and
the IADB, regulated costs run at $38/MWh. (MINEM - IADB, 2012) In contrast, according to
interviews (interviewees 4, 28) Brazilian power markets estimate long-term marginal per unit
costs at or above $80/MWh. Thus, it is not expected that Inambari's power will find interested
buyers in the Peruvian market, at least not before the 30-year exclusive concession to Brazil
expires.
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Hydropower development in Per6 will not meet its potential until the prices of natural gas
and the subsidies to thermal plants are eliminated. Economically, the rationale for a plant as
large as Inambari is presently weak, seeing that neither distributors in the SEIN nor large
consumers, such as mining operations, may find the -$60/MWh cost attractive. However, this
does not rule out the need to incorporate the project as generation costs rise over the next
decade, especially as natural gas reserves from Camisea dwindle. According to MINEM, during
the most recent round of auctions for small hydropower (2011), average prices from bidders
came at approximately $60/MWh. This figure suggests that, in a large versus small hydro
comparison, Inambari would be competitive at least from a cost-minimization perspective-
assuming the power is dispatched first and foremost to the Peruvian market.
Indeed, recognizing the need for large hydropower in future generation, a joint MEM-IADB
report published in early 2012 includes Inambari in a number of long-term scenarios and
assumes its integration to the Peruvian grid sometime between 2020-2040. The document
lays out potential transmission expansion horizons in which plants in the lower Amazon
region would not connect to the grid until after 2030. (MINEM - IADB, 2012) These projections
imply that the plant would no longer sell power exclusively to the Brazilian market, though
there are no official pronouncements about who will take on the project now that the
temporary concession to EGASUR has been revoked.
In light of these figures and the recent history of Brazilian-Peruvian energy ventures, the
universe of alternatives to projects like Inambari and Patizkapango is vast and difficult to
navigate. If the Peruvian's government ultimate objective were to maximize rent gains from
the international sale of power, then a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis would seek to
find the lowest cost option, including social and environmental impacts. According to MINAM
reports from 2009 and 2010, over the 30-year agreement period, total gains from electricity
sales would total $1.7 billion, while economic costs due to the loss of environmental goods
and services in the Cusco, Puno, and Madre de Dios provinces would total $2.1 billion. This
official valuation translates into a $420 million loss for PerO. Moreover, according to critics of
the project, such as the environmental organization International Rivers, Inambari would
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displace at least 15,000 people and increase social and environmental conflicts. This could
lead to substantial cost overruns. This begs the question-who is the biggest beneficiary of
large hydropower for export in Pero's Amazon region? Some of the most important potential
benefits for Brazil are presented and discussed in this chapter's following section.
In contrast, options could be weighed against the goal of security of supply for domestic use.
Authorities need to frame the debate in terms of how Inambari and large hydropower
projects in water-rich, Amazonian PerO can legitimately offset the unavoidable carbonization
of the country's generation portfolio due to the overwhelming use of natural gas for
electricity generation. Even prominent Latin American environmental science experts such as
Marc Dourojeanni recognize that the aggregate impact of numerous small hydropower
projects may be exponentially worse than that of large dams-a comparison that merits
further, quantitative research. Dourojeanni argued in a recent interview that, from a policy
perspective and in the absence of detail studies on the benefits of large versus small
hydropower, it is conceivable that building one hydropower megaproject like Inambari could
ease the transition out natural gas and fossil-fired generation until non-traditional renewables
become cost-competitive in Per6. This would be especially true if the government had to pick
between Inambari and other dams in the Amazon region. The Pakitzapango dam, for
example, could cause even more acute social and environmental conflicts. Unlike Inambari,
the project is adjacent to special protected areas, such as the Otishi national park. 10,000
people could be displaced, the majority of which belong to the Ashaninka indigenous
community currently living on protected reservations on the Ene river basin. It is worth noting
that the Ashaninka communities have continuously suffered from conflict with and because
of the state. Until the 1990s, they were caught in the middle of the violent struggle between
the Peruvian government and the terrorist group Shining Path, leaving hundreds of casualties
among the Ashaninkas. (Nelsen, 2012)
The contribution of non-traditional renewable sources to overall supply is negligible: less than
1 % of total electricity produced in 2010. Presently, according to the MINEM-IADB study,
auction prices for wind generation are $80/MWh, biomass auction (ongoing) have a base cost
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of $65/MWh, and small hydropower closed at $60/MWh during the first round of auctions
(2010). In contrast, coal generation is estimated at $48/MWh, but it ranks lower as an
alternative due to potential emissions as well as the relatively small indigenous coal reserves
available in Per6. There is considerable room for growth for non-traditional renewables, but in
the absence of actual commitments or regulatory supports to level the playing field vis-A-vis
natural gas and coal, PerO will continue to rely on fossil-fired generation and look to large
hydropower as a long-term, cost-competitive complementary technology to gas-fired power.
Inambari and the Brazil-PerO agreement raise questions about the need for electricity
integration, and the best way to achieve it over time. In contrast, Chile has an urgent need to
secure indigenous electricity supplies, in part because of its negative experiences with bi-
national energy integration with its neighbor, Argentina, as well as its overreliance on
imported fuels of natural gas, coal, and oil. The proposal for HidroAysen has incited a highly
controversial debate about why, and for whom, Chile needs to grow its domestic generation
activity, as well as how best to do it.
The chronology of HidroAysen bears striking resemblance to most hydropower projects in
South America. As early as 1947, Chile's main utility, Endesa (still publicly-owned at that time)
began to estimate the country's hydropower potential. By 1975, pre-feasibility studies
demonstrated that the Baker and Pascua rivers, located in the sparsely populated Aysen,
Chile's 11th region-the country has no provinces but 'regions,' 15 total-could house
hydropower projects of close to 3,000MW in installed capacity. Human development has
hardly affected the area, which remains an environmental conservation and tourism haven.
Much of the controversy around the project stems from the possibility that HidroAysen, its
transmission lines, and the roads needed to build these projects, will unchain rapid
development in an otherwise pristine area. According to documents from HidroAysen S.A.,
the consortium currently developing the project, the original studies called for massive
reservoirs that would have flooded approximately 30,000 hectares. The project's potential
capacity was ultimately larger than Chile's entire demand at the time, so plans were saved for
a future time.
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In the early 1980s, after General Augusto Pinochet's military government established an
unbundled, market-oriented electricity sector, private firms focused on developing
hydropower and coal generation plants in the central region's SIC, one of the four main
transmission networks in operation in the country. As power demand from mining operations
in the north grew, coal and other fossil-fired generation expanded in the SING. A considerable
portion of the country's hydropower capacity dates from this period, including some of the
SIC's largest dams: Colb~n (400MW, 1985), Antuco (300MW, 1981), El Toro (400MW, 1973),
Canutillar (145MW, 1990), Pangue (467MW, 1996), Pehuenche (500MW, 1991), and the
controversial Ralco (690MW, 2004), the last large hydro project built in Chile. (INE, 2008)
Indeed, this geographic concentration remains strong today. As of 2008, 99% of the country's
hydropower capacity was in the SIC, of which close to 70% came from projects with
reservoirs. (IEA, 2009)
The late 1990s brought plentiful and cheap reserves of natural gas from Argentina. It was a
panacea for private developers-gas-fired plants require small upfront capital investments
and, given cheap supply, entail low operation costs. Hydropower was nonetheless a cost-
competitive option. At approximately $55/MWh, companies with ownership over water
rights-Endesa owns close to 75% of all rights in Chile, as reported by CADE's 2011 study-
could easily develop lucrative projects. Moreover, given the high degree of concentration in
generation assets in Chile-three holding companies own almost 90% of capacity in the
SIC-hydropower presented a crucial opportunity to optimize the overall generation
portfolio by offering base load electricity in combination with coal and gas peak load power.
Since the 2000s, two events have had a considerable impact on hydropower development.
The Ralco plant, finished in 2004 during Ernesto Frey's presidency, sparked highly visible
controversies, not just about hydropower, but also about large energy projects in general.
The project's reservoir partially flooded sacred Mapuche territories and experienced delays
and cost overruns. As Universidad de Chile professor Hugh Rudnick put it in a recent
interview, it was a bitter and timely realization for investors that social and environmental
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issues would have to be addressed early and transparently. A second event came in 2004,
when Argentina unexpectedly shut off gas supplies to Chile, resulting in shortages and
ultimately requiring reforms in the sector to offset the risks associated with foreign fuel
dependency and increase confidence among investors in generation assets.
These events set the background against which Endesa dusted off plans for HidroAysen.
Between 2004 and 2007, the company revisited the original design and found ways to reduce
the potential for environmental and social conflict while still maximizing capacity for
generation. According to representatives from HidroAysen S.A., by 2007 the company
reduced the flood area from 30,000 to 5,910 has, mainly by breaking apart the project from a
single dam to a complex of five dams. (Fig. 25) In the three-year period since 2004, after
Chile's National Competition Tribunal (TDLC) expressed concern about the potential
monopolistic practices, HidroAysen S.A. included ColbOn as a partner, with 49% of stakes
(versus Endesa's 51%). Total installed capacity is now proposed at 2,700MW, which is
necessary for the company to find profit in the project while still being able to finance the
complex, including a key component: the 2,000km high voltage transmission line connecting
HidroAysen to the SIC. Initially, HidroAysen partnered with Chile's sole transmission company,
privately owned Transelec, to build the power lines as a joint venture.
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Figure 25 Location of the proposed HidroAysin dam complex. From HidroAysin S.A.
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Though the sponsors first engaged communities in the Aysen region in late 2007, public
debates about the project were already in full force. In late 2008, HidroAysen S.A. finalized
and socialized the results of the required environmental impact assessment (EIA). The
document received over 3,000 comments from 32 regional public agencies and over 4,000
from civil society organizations. (Romsn, Hall, Cuevas, & S~nchez, 2009) This crippling amount
forced HidroAysen to request the oversight authority, the Servicio de Evaluaci6n Ambiental
(SEIA), eleven months fully to respond to the public's observations.
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Projects with limited impact do not trigger a full environmental review, but simply a
Declaration of Environmental Impacts (DIA); HidroAysen required a full EIA. 1 If a proposed
development affects more than one region, the EIA includes not only the relevant Regional
Environmental Commission (COREMA), but also the National Environmental Commission
(CONAMA). In the case of HidroAysen, the dam complex was considered separately from the
transmission lines, thus triggering only a regional-level impact assessment and creating a
multi-phased socialization of the project. The 2,000km power lines will require extensive
negotiations with numerous property owners and communities in south and central Chile,
and will, as will be discussed later in this chapter, test the institutional efficacy of the country's
existing environmental review framework.
By mid 2009, HidroAysen S.A. included a 5,000-page addenda to the original 15,000-page EIA,
to be reviewed in 15 days by the Aysen's 32 regional public agencies. A full two years later
and after four rounds of review, the regional COREMA approved HA's EIA in May 2011. A
strong coalition of national and international environmental organizations mobilized
resources against HidroAysen and sued the company, alleging irregularities in the EIA
process. Litigation escalated all the way to Chile's Supreme Court, which, by March 2012,
ruled in favor of HidroAysen S.A. Altogether, between 2007 and 2012, the project's cost grew
from $4 to $10 billion. The transmission portion currently represents close to 50% of total
cost. The drafting and exposition of the transmission's EIA will be hotly contested and will
surely result in cost overruns that may yet make HA too risky for the sponsors and potential
investors.
HidroAysen broadly expanded the dialogue about Chile's development future. As is evident
in the country's National Energy Strategy (2012), President Sebastian Piiera's administration
fully believes development is necessary to make a "great leap" in terms of education, health,
housing, and poverty reduction, and that the key to development is "sustained economic
According to Law 19,300 (1994), ElAs are required when there are potential health impacts due to waste and
emissions, effects on the quality and quantity of natural resources, significant changes to the landscape value of
a site, changes to sites with cultural, architectural, archeological, or anthropological value, and when they are
near, or threaten the livelihoods of, human settlements.
102
The Role of the State in Large-Scale Hydropower Development
growth" of over 6% per year. The report draws an explicit connection between energy and
development, and ultimately, between energy use and poverty reduction. (MEC, 2012)
According to officers from Transelec, some of the most prominent landowners on the
projected path for the transmission line, such as American magnate and environmental
activist Douglas Tompkins, question the government's ultimate goal of rapid GDP growth.
However, debates among industry experts from Transelec, HidroAysen S.A., civil society
organizations like the international coalition Patagonia Sin Represas, and government officials
in the Ministry of Energy, implicitly accept the link between development and economic
growth. Rather, the arguments for and against HA focus on 1) whether, from all the
generation alternatives available to Chile, large hydropower is the best way to meet growing
energy needs and 2) the level of governmental direction and involvement in the push for
specific generation technologies.
In mid 2011, largely due to growing public concern about HA and similar large-scale energy
projects, Pifera's government assembled the Advisory Commission for Electrical
Development (CADE), a multi-sectorial, inter-disciplinary panel, to complete a report
analyzing Chile's energy challenges and future proposals, observing principles of security,
quality, sustainability, and efficiency. The resulting document provides a valuable and far-
reaching investigation of Chile's energy sector, and highlights, yet again, the need to develop
domestic energy sources to secure cleaner and affordable supplies. (CADE, 2011) The CADE
compiled public surveys showing clear public support in favor of non-traditional renewables
and catalogued up-to-date data on potential resources such as solar, wind, small hydro, and
geothermal, most of which could be cost-competitive with traditional generation
technologies within the next decade. In terms of market structure and institutional oversight,
the report demonstrates underinvestment and high levels of risk in transmission planning
and development, and argues for the creation of a centralized, long-term transmission
planning entity. High end-user costs, for both regulated customers and consumers that
purchase energy through direct long-term contracts with distributors and generators, are a
looming problem in Chile's sector. The CADE report attributes the problem mostly to the high
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price of imported fuels for generation, as well as weaknesses in the design of long-term
contracts.
Contrary to Pihera's expectations, drafting of the report did not meet positive responses from
civil society or various representatives from Chile's congress, many of whom were dissatisfied
with the lack of open, widespread public participation in CADE's initial work. In response, a
large number of stakeholders, such as environmental organizations, local community
development agencies, and political representatives (including Antonio Horvath, Senator for
Aysen), gathered as the Citizen Technical and Parliamentary Commission for the Transition to
Clean, Secure, Sustainable and Just Electrical Development (CCTP) and drafted a parallel
report. The CCTP's work is much more emphatic about the need to create technology-specific
regulatory supports, lift barriers to entry, and set binding deployment targets for renewable
technologies-20% of total generation by 2020, a more ambitious target than the 10% by
2024 proposed by the 2007 law on renewables, Ley 20.257. (CCTP, 2011)
This report is much more critical of market concentration and denounces oligopolistic
behavior in electricity markets as a more plausible explanation for high end-user prices. With
respect to megaprojects like HA, the CCTP argues that Chile can successfully rely on non-
traditional renewables and energy efficiency to meet long-term energy needs, assuming
credible political commitment to these technologies. Echoing the work of academics Roberto
Roman and Stephen Hall, the CCTP argues that Chile's projected electricity growth over the
next decade need not follow a business as usual path, at approximately 6% per year. Instead,
power demand growth expectations should be closer to 4% per year without sacrifices on
productivity gains, even considering expansion of mining operations in the SING. (CCTP, 2011;
Romsn & Hall, 2011) In other words, the CCTP and its supporters insist that Chile simply does
not need to embark on a project like HA to meet its growth targets.
In interviews carried out earlier this year, representatives from the Ministry of Energy,
Transelec, and the CADE (interviewees no. 3, 6,25) all worry that Chile has few long-term
alternatives to secure base load supply. Some of the country's largest potential projects have
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met similar opposition to HA; emblematic examples include coal-fired Castilla, a 2,350MW
plant in the SING built largely to supply power for mining, and Campiche, a 240MW coal-fired
plant in the SIC whose original environmental license was revoked by the Supreme Court in
2009. Litigation against energy megaprojects now seems unavoidable in Chile, which points
to regulatory and institutional design failures in energy and environmental planning the
country. The CADE warns that, should HA fail, Chile will have to slowly meet its growing
demands through small and medium-sized thermal plants. After 2020, according to officers
from the Ministry of Energy, country will have no choice but to reconsider nuclear power as
means to meet base load demand. Earthquake-prone Chile has historically shied away from
this clean but expensive and risky option.
Both the CADE and the CCTP agree on the growing importance of renewables in the supply of
electricity, but the former's position is that this role will be marginal until technologies
become cost-competitive. Moreover, intermittence of wind and solar technologies will
unavoidably require complementary hydropower to secure supply, not to mention significant
investments in transmission to ensure grid connection for these technologies. More
importantly, CADE members as well as government officials take a position that is common
across South American countries, and indeed among many energy experts around the world:
Chile cannot bet on technologies that are more expensive when one of its main goals is to
decrease end-user prices. Finally, as a matter of industrial policy, emerging economies like
Chile will have to provide considerable subsidies to promote local manufacture of renewable
technologies, and play catch-up with established players in Spain and Denmark, two of the
world's leading wind turbine manufacturers, and China and Germany, who lead in solar
technologies.
Leaving local labor aside-a contentious issue in Ecuador and Pero for those excluded from
participation in large mega projects-the most basic disagreement over non-traditional
renewables is about generation costs. Last year, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), a New York-based international environmental organization, partnered with
Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Chile's Valgesta Energia to analyze the cost of energy per
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unit of energy production across all generation technologies available to the country,
including large hydropower, coal, gas, and diesel, as well as non-traditional renewables, such
as solar photovoltaic and thermal, wind, geothermal, biomass, and small hydro. The study
found that, given current costs for new traditional plants in Chilean markets, small hydro,
biomass, and onshore wind can compete with natural gas and coal on a per MWh basis.
(NRDC, 2011) By 2020, given decreases in global prices of solar PV and solar thermal, these
technologies could also be cost-competitive without subsidies. (Fig. 26)
Figure 26. Chile Levelised Cost of Energy for 2020. From NRDC, 2011.
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Also in 2011, two Chilean academics, Alexander Galetovic and Cristi6n Muioz, published an
article comparing the costs of coal versus onshore wind generation in Chile. Even quantifying
environmental externalities at $17/MWh, coal-fired power technology is considerably
cheaper: $78/MWh for a 260MW coal plant versus $136/MWh for a 943MW (24% capacity
factor) capable of producing the same amount of energy. (Galetovic & Muioz, 2011)
Moreover, given the wind farm's intermittent generation, in order to keep reliability in the
electricity system (measured by an average loss of load probability, or LOLP, of 7%), cost of
generation would increase as thermal plants inject backup power to meet supply
commitments. Interestingly, these estimations fall within the ranges included in the NRDC's
study. However, Galetovic and Muioz's implicit position is that market players in Chile will
not find it attractive to invest without some other economic or political incentive.
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The cost of reliability is a thorny issue in the debates about renewables in Chile. As Araneda et
al. (2010) have noted, prefiguring some of the recommendations included in the CADE report,
transmission regulation would require a major overhaul to reduce the barriers of entry to
technologies like wind. Wind farm construction takes between 1.5 and 3 years, whereas, given
the current institutional and regulatory landscape for private transmission development, grid
infrastructure can take as many as 6 years to complete, in part due to now common delays in
the EIA approval process in Chile. Moreover, the economic incentives do not favor
renewables:
Existing regulation allocates payments of the transmission lines to generators based on line usage
over time. Wind farms may push large transmission expansions that do not coincide with their
small proportion on transmission payments because of the low plant factors of wind generation.
Therefore, existing generators could potentially see toll payments increases and so will oppose to
such expansion projects. This, in turn, can potentially affect the connection decision of wind
power projects because of the risk of congestion in the transmission grid. (Araneda, Mocarquer,
Moreno, & Rudnick, 2010: 3)
Cost disincentives and grid integration are common arguments for a cautious push for
renewables in Chile. Currently, the Chilean parliament is discussing the "20/20" law, which
would amend 20.257 by establishing much more ambitious targets for the deployment of
renewables (20% by 2020) and support mechanisms such as feed-in-tariffs for small
hydropower. Notably, even those skeptical of 20/20 and who have modest faith in non-
conventional technologies believe Chile's government needs to reconsider its regulatory
approach to transmission and generation planning. Testament to this call for government
action is that, on May 30, 2012, Colbin unilaterally stopped all activities related to HA's
transmission development. While critics argue that this is the company's bluff to pressure the
government into a more supportive position, Colb~n affirms that they cannot move forward
unless Pihera's government settles on a stronger and clearer vision for the country's energy
sector, something more than the principles outlined in the recently published National
Energy Strategy. (Redacci6n El Mercurio, 2012) In this sense, HA marks a watershed moment
for energy governance in Chile, as it has begun a nation-wide debate on large hydropower
and its alternatives.
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New Monies, New Safeguards?
Traditionally, the debate over hydropower has had an international scale. A major global shift
took place starting in the 1980s: in response to widespread criticisms about the impacts and
inefficacies of megaprojects, governments and multilateral sponsors such as the World Bank
and regional development banks attached much stronger social and environmental
safeguards, while also demonstrated a clear preference for smaller, less risky projects. By the
early 2000s, two parallel reports on the planning, development, and operations of large dams
were published by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) and the IEA. The former laid down
a series of basic safeguards and guarantees that dam sponsors would have to observe before
and during implementation. These recommendations were, and still are, highly controversial;
critics, many of whom were officials from developing countries, argue that the WCD
recommends a compliance checklist that gives too much power to multilateral agencies and
effectively kills the possibility to build future projects. (Gagnon et al., 2002) Environmental
groups around the world consider this same report a landmark victory, for it finally
recognized the risks and negative impacts associated with large hydro. (McCully, 2001) By
contrast, the IEA, which was decidedly pro-hydropower, argued for strong government
involvement and for states to improve the social and environmental performance of large
projects. (IEA, 2000)
Important efforts have taken place in recent years, such as the International Hydropower
Association's (IHA) Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, released in late 2010. The
Protocol is "an enhanced sustainability assessment tool for the four main stages of
hydropower development: Early Stage, Preparation, Implementation and Operation (...) It
relies on objective evidence to create a sustainability profile against some 20 topics." (IHA,
2011: 1) Experts from more than 28 countries gave input to the final product. International
environmental organizations such as WWF, Oxfam, and The Nature Conservancy joined
government representatives from China, Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Zambia, as well
officers from multi-lateral agencies like The World Bank-a much broader and diverse set of
stakeholders. It took this group over three years of research and analysis to produce the
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protocol, which will officially launch in 2014, when participants begin to use it to evaluate
hydropower projects.
The reality today is that international efforts such as the IHA's can barely keep up with the
speed of hydropower development. As Pittock (2010) highlights, the IHA members-
including the world's largest energy developers from China to Europe to Brazil-have not yet
reached agreement on whether the Protocol will remain as a voluntary tool, or if it will evolve
as part of worldwide third-party certification process. Meanwhile, projects like CCS, Inambari,
and HA pit civil society organizations, government agencies, and private developers against
one another to determine the 'sustainability'of projects through local assessment processes,
or, simply, by fighting each other in the courts.
There is one prominent catalytic for the speed of hydropower development: the availability of
financial resources through bilateral, governmental agreements between emerging
economies. In Latin America, south-south development ventures present new challenges to
local governments, who often sacrifice social and environmental safeguards for ready access
to capital from so-called 'middle economies.'In this new landscape, the two main actors in
South America are China and Brazil.
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government began development of today's largest
hydropower project, the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River (21GW). When it partnered
with established American and European developers, such as ABB, ALSTOM, General Electric,
and Siemens, it required them to build at least 50% of all turbines and generators on Chinese
soil. These and other joint ventures helped give rise to China's leading hydropower
contractors: SinoHydro, Harbin Power (both of which are involved in dam construction in
Ecuador), and Dongfang Electric Machinery. Over the last decade, these companies have
actively pursued international contracts. The Chinese government has actively supported this
move, since it not only creates jobs in the country, but also directly helps resource extraction
in trading partner countries by supplying local power. (Bosshard, 2009; Pittock, 2010)
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China's Exim Bank has been central to the financing of international hydropower ventures.
First established in the mid-1 990s, its international project portfolio is one of the largest in the
world: in 2009 and 2010, it lent over $110 billion to other developing countries, compared to
the World Bank's $100 billion, itself a record figure for the multi-lateral organization. (Dyer,
Anderlini, & Sender, 2011) According to a 2010 study by International Rivers' Peter Bosshard,
Chinese companies and financiers had interests in at least 220 dams in 50 countries and are
were building 19 of the world's 24 largest hydropower plants; export earnings from power
generation equipment was second only to electrical appliances. (Bosshard, 2009)
China, more than its South American partners, has a strong interest in rapid development of
hydropower to curb greenhouse gas emissions. China's CO2 emissions are growing at
staggering rates. Starting in 2007, China overtook the United States as the world's largest
emitter of GHG; in 2008, China accounted for close to 23% of global emissions. According to
the IEA's predictions, emissions almost tripled between 1990 and 2008, and while they may
slow down slightly in the future, emissions will be twice as large by 2030. (IEA, 2010)
Currently, 48% of emissions come from electricity and heat generation. In particular,
electricity in China is largely produced from coal, which, according to the EIA, represents
almost 80% of power generation feedstock. (Figs. 27-28)
Figure 27. China: CO2 Emissions by Sector. lEA, 2010.
Mt Co2
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000 T-
2000
1000
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
" Electricity and heat N Other energy industries
* Manuf. ind. and construction U Transport
E1 Residential 0 Other
110
The Role of the State in Large-Scale Hydropower Development
Figure 28. China: Electricity Generation by Fuel Type. lEA, 2010.
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At the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, China declared it would reduce carbon
intensity (emissions per unit of output) by 40% by 2020. To curb coal-fired emissions, the
country's 2010 five-year plan includes one of the most aggressive plans for hydropower
development in the world: a staggering 140GW of new capacity, or almost twice as much as
the United States' hydro development in all its history (80GW). Naturally, Chinese domestic
development of hydropower has come under considerable scrutiny and criticism. In an
unprecedented move, last year the government admitted that the Three Gorges Dam had
caused significant problems in terms of people displacement and contributed to ecological
disasters, such as droughts and flooding. (The Economist, 2011) According to reports on
China Daily, quoted in Pittock (2010), China's Ministry of Water announced in 2009 it would
"limit hydropower to 60% of potentially feasible developments, and withdrawals to 30%
available water resources by 2030 in the Yangtze River Basin Master Plan that is currently in
preparation." (Pittock, 2010:447) These measures represent progress toward the
development of better social and environmental standards for the world's largest dam-
builder. Nonetheless, neither the government nor its main hydropower contractors have a
clear set of safeguards and protocols for development-especially not when working outside
Chinese territory.
Brazil's history with hydropower runs even deeper than China's. Since the opening of the
Itaipu dam along the Paraguay-Brazil border in 1978, under the military rule of General
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Ernesto Geisel, Brazil has decisively expanded its hydropower generation portfolio
throughout the country. In 2010, hydroelectricity accounted for 85% of all electricity
generated in the country. (EIA, 2012) Similar to the case of Ecuadorian energy policy,
infrastructure development carried out in the 1970s has left a strong legacy in Brazil. Having
served as the President of publicly-owned oil company Petrobras in the late 1960s, Geisel was
no stranger to the critical role government played in energy infrastructure and its intimate
relationship with sovereign control over natural resources since the 1950s. (Levine, 1970)
In fact, this is a critical element in Brazilian historical, internal and westward, territorial
conquest. From the colonial era to the days of the military dictatorship, rulers have seen
sovereignty over the Amazon as central to Brazil's national security. (Baer, 2007; Teixeira,
1996) After a brief period of experimentation with imported nuclear technologies for
electricity generation, the military leaders looked inward toward Brazil's interior, and not just
for hydropower potential. Geisel's administration launched the Pr6-Alcool program with the
goal of significantly expanding the country's sugar-cane crop for ethanol. The program did
not yield results until the 2000s with the massive deployment of the 'flex fuel engine,' a
technology that turned Brazil into a global leader in the ethanol industry. (Kovarik, 2008) In
the early 1970s, these efforts initially appeared fruitless and simply helped Petrobras justify its
push for offshore exploration; the results also justified the company's own modest record in
production up until that point. However, by the turn of the decade, offshore reserves along
Brazil's coast would considerably increase the country's production capacity. (Philip, 1982)
These exploration successes prefigured the recent offshore oil discoveries that have granted
Brazil oil self-sufficiency. The 70s "big push" in the energy sector was about economic
independence and a way to secure future development, and it paid off in the long-run.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil experienced the same controversies and difficulties as
Ecuador and other developing countries: there was virtually no funding available for large
hydropower, or for any kind of megaproject. Nonetheless, hydraulic power is central to
Brazil's electricity needs: over the last two decades, hydro has supplied between 70 and 90%
of electricity. In 2006, when President Lula first rose to power, large scale energy ventures
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made a decisive comeback. Lula's first platform was partly founded on a new energy security
agenda as a response to a severe crisis that took place in 2001-2002, the result both of
underinvestment from the private sector combined with an unusually harsh drought. During
his first term, Lula successfully reversed many of his predecessor Fernando Henrique
Cardoso's privatization measures in the power sector. Cardoso's fiscal measures and the
liberalization of electric utilities in the late 1990s slowed down investments in the overall
power system. (Goertzel, 1999) Lula's presidency marked the return of a state-driven
investment model, in which large dams and other ambitious energy initiatives have, once
again, taken a protagonist role in Brazil's developmental agenda.
Lula's successor, current President Dilma Rousseff, first made a name for herself as Minister of
Energy. Lula and Rouseff are the chief architects of Brazil's first and second Growth
Acceleration Programs (PAC) that outline priority areas for sectorial investments in ways that
echo Geisel's policies from the 1970s. (PAC, 2011) Tellingly, energy infrastructure represents
the largest share of total investment in these development master plans. For the period from
2007-2014, more than 50 percent of the USD$900 billion dollars included in PAC is focused on
the energy sector, and specifically 15 percent of the total (BR$200 billion, or US$120 billion) is
devoted to electricity generation, mainly by financing hydroelectric dams and thermal plants.
In a recent interview, a member of Brazil's WWF office (interviewee no. 4) noted that the
country's energy sector has a strong, historic dam-building culture, with prominent
barrageiros who favor multi-purpose dam development throughout the country. Evidence of
this is the success of construction companies such as Odebrecht, OAS, Andrade Gutierres, and
Camargo Correa-arguably more experienced than their Chinese competitors-who are
active hydro developers in Brazil and abroad. These companies have strong ties to public
utilities like Electrobras and the government itself, as is evident in the development
consortium behind Per6's Inambari. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Brazilian
government actively negotiated with President Correa on behalf of Odebrecht after he seized
the company's hydropower assets in Ecuador.
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Brazil relies on dams over other power sources because of its capacity to offer large-scale
energy storage. Unlike agencies in other, more diverse power networks, the Brazilian system
operator uses a hydro-based, central optimization model to make electricity dispatch
decisions. The electricity system operator considers all hydro basins (which represent over
80% of the country's 116GW capacity) regardless of ownership or contract region, and will
make independent decisions on what plants or dams should deliver power. (Fig. 29) Large
reservoirs that can feed stored water to hydro turbines give the operator a cushion in the face
of a potential drop in supply, which is why large dams play a critical role in plans for
electrification in the country, as well as a way to offset variability from non-traditional
renewables. In other words, Brazil's central optimization model gains considerable stability by
including the electric output of large hydropower into its calculations.
Figure 29. Brazil's main hydro generation assets. From Brazil's ONS.
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Ever-growing power needs have turned the Amazon region into the final frontier for
hydropower development, not just in Brazil, but also in neighboring Amazonian countries.
The country's interest in the Brazil-PerO is strategic: building large dams in Peruvian territories
expands the system operator's reach close to the Andes Mountains, the ultimate source of the
Amazon's river flows. Inambari not only supplies Brazil power for exclusive consumption, it
also helps the country's system operator regulate water flows on the Madeira river basin
(whose waters represent 20% of the Amazon river's total tributaries). Further downstream, in
Brazilian lands, two massive hydropower projects will come online in the next couple of years:
Jirau (3,900MW) and Santo Antonio (3,580MW), for $15.6 billion. While there have been
considerable protests due to insufficient respect to prior consultation of indigenous
communities living on the Madeira basin, there have not been significant environmental
impact objections. Brazilian energy and environmental authorities have a three-step
environmental licensing process, during which project sponsors must consider "cumulative
impacts" all along a specific basin. This approach tends to reduce impacts associated with
reservoirs but rarely results in outright denial of licenses. As WWF Brazil argues, cumulative
environmental impact analysis effectively sets a ceiling for social and environmental
degradation on Brazilian basins, but rarely limits the actual number of hydropower projects
on a single river.
According to Serra Vega (2011), Brazilian environmental authorities set limits on the size of
these dams' reservoirs, to the point that these are officially considered run-of-river projects.
To optimize flows to these plants and transfer reservoir capacity outside of Brazilian territory,
Jirau and Santo Antonio are part of a four-plant complex that includes Pero's Inambari and
the Cachuela Esperanza dam (800MW), in Bolivia's Amazon region. Exclusive access to the
upstream plants permits Brazilian energy operators to send water during times of drought to
Jirau and San Antonio.
Like China's Exim Bank, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) provides substantial
financial commitments for the development of energy megaprojects, in Brazil and abroad.
Founded in the late 1950s, BNDES today has a massive loan portfolio. According The
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Economist magazine, the Bank's rate of lending surpasses that of the World Bank; in 2009,
gross disbursements reached $69 billion, twice the amount disbursed in 2007. BNDES lends at
approximately 6%, considerably below the yield on ten-year government bonds, 12%; the
Brazilian treasury subsidizes the difference. (The Economist, 2010)
In this context, governments such as Ecuador and PerG act not just as sponsors and evaluators
of projects, but also as mediators: they must reconcile voluntary and binding international
agreements with local norms, while also accepting the explicit and implicit conditions that
come with special binational partnerships. This mediation is clear in the case of CCS as well as
Inambari, projects for which Ecuador and PerO have re-interpreted local environmental and
energy regulations to accommodate the practices of international contractors. Thus, south-
south development ventures add a new layer to Flyvberg's conflict of interest. The author
notes that "the question has to be asked whether or not a government can act effectively as
both promoter of a project, and the guardian of public interest issues such as protection of
the environment, safety and of the taxpayer against unnecessary financial risks." (Flyvberg et
al., 2003: 91) This double role now extends beyond a country's own boundaries. It is not
simply Ecuador or PerO who have to ensure comprehensive "protection," but also funders and
contractors such as China and Brazil that act in the absence of any kind of monitoring
mechanisms other than those offered by their national counterparts.
Organizations like WWF Brazil have sought to reach consensus outside the figure of the EIA.
Per actor network theory, the EIA is an "obligatory passage point," an indispensable and
unavoidable set of procedures and institutions. (Callon, 1986) More cynically, the assessment
becomes an added cost that at best delays detrimental projects and rarely ever stops them.
As an alternative, the WWF is working with energy authorities in the Brazil to agree on a
minimum number of rivers that should never be altered, i.e., not the ceiling imposed through
the EIA, but a floor from which to launch new hydropower developments. Globally, the WWF
wants governments to develop up to 30% of economically feasible potential by nation or
river basin and keep ecologically-significant river areas within basins flowing free. "WWF
estimated that 250 GW of large hydropower sites could be developed with relatively low
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impacts, plus an additional 20 GW for medium, 100 GW from small, and 30 GW from re-
powering hydropower plants." (Pittock, 2010:448)
This is a compelling approach, but there is no guarantee that governments will not revert the
decision to leave certain rivers and basin areas unharmed. In Brazil, for instance,
environmental expert Phillip Fearnside has argued that the proposed design for Belo Monte,
set to become the world's third largest dam in terms of capacity (11,000MW), will unchain
additional construction on the Xingu river basin. A study published by Eletrobras in 2009
estimated actual capacity to be less than half the 11GW figure, due to seasonal differences in
water flow that could not be countered with smaller than 'ideal' reservoirs. Elsewhere in the
Brazilian Amazon, projects such as the Balbina reservoir and the Tucuri complex dramatically
increased in scope and footprint after construction began in 1987 and 1998. (Fearnside, 2006)
The Chinese government has also earned a similar reputation for expanding dam projects
after completion in order to maximize the benefits from the original investment. Critics of
hydropower have reason to fear proposed design as simply the "tip of the iceberg" and that
governments will eventually have to build additional reservoirs or complementary plants.
Chile's HidroAysen S.A. will likely seek international financing to HA. Civil society groups who
disapprove of the project are confident that public concern, and, critically, ongoing judicial
troubles, will prevent 'traditional' international investors from participating. However, in
interviews carried out earlier this year, academic advisors to, and members of, non-
governmental, environmental organizations like Patagonia Sin Represas (interviewees no. 19,
23, 29) have expressed concern over reports that China's State Grid submitted a formal
proposal to build HA's power lines. (GTR, 2012) Chile's environmental impact review
processes seem unavoidably to lead to litigation in the case of megaprojects like HA.
However, the country's regulatory and judicial environment is considerably more transparent
and fair than Ecuador's. This suggest that, should the SEIA or the Supreme Court rule against
HA's proposed transmission, there is little State Grid or any other partner could do beyond
that. Interestingly, based on the CADE's recommendation, energy experts believe that future
transmission planning south of the SIC will no longer be the sole responsibility of private
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players. If the debates over HA force the government to 'internalize' the risk associated with
transmission development, then Chile will find itself in a similar position to that of Ecuador
and Per--that of sponsor, protector, and mediator.
Territorial Contests over Hydropower Sites
All three case countries highlight one of the most tangible tensions in the development of
large hydropower in South America. In the case of Ecuador and Peru, a great portion of the
region's hydroelectric potential is located east of the Andes Mountains, extending out to the
heart of the Amazonian rainforest. This region comprises extensive environmental
conservation areas and protected indigenous territories. Chile is not an Amazonian country,
yet it exhibits the same concentration. Whereas northern Chile is an arid desert, home to
some of the largest mining interests, southern regions, particularly Los Rfos and Aysen, have
most of the country's water resources, as well as a large number of protected areas for
conservation. Additionally, numerous Mapuche and other indigenous groups live in special
territorial units in southern Chile. Large hydropower development in these regions will not
move forward-at least not peacefully-without significant mediation from the state. In
those cases when energy projects clash with the goals of conservation and the rights of
indigenous peoples, the governments of Ecuador, Pero, and Chile have already or will
eventually devise regulatory and institutional solutions to resolve conflicting territorial goals.
Territorial overlap is not a new phenomenon in South America, one of the most resource-rich
and bio-diverse areas in the world. This is especially true in countries like Ecuador and Pero
who have found expansive hydrocarbon reserves in the Amazon region. Governments have
granted oil and mining concessions within areas previously dedicated for conservation,
revealing severe contradiction in local regulation governing the environment and extractive
industries-the latter usually takes precedence. Similarly, infrastructure development and
resource extraction often takes place in indigenous peoples'lands, often without
consideration to their rights. (Stavenhagen, 2006)
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In Ecuador, as discussed in Chapter 2, almost 90% of the country's economically feasible
potential, 21GW, lie on the Amazonian watershed. (CONELEC, 2009) This region encompasses
the majority of Ecuador's protected areas and national parks. Ecuador has a number of
working categories for conservation that exists along a continuum of permissible uses,
ranging from intangible to limited exploitation. CCS and its transmission lines will affect no
fewer than six protected areas: the Cayambe Coca Reserve, La Cascada Forest, La Alta y Media
del Rio Tigre Forests, Napo-Galeras Sumac National Park, Condor Biodiversity Reserve, and the
Sumac Biosphere Reserve.
Figure 30. Ecuador's National System for Protected Areas. From MAE, 2012.
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Chapter 2. Presenting Case: Ecuador's Coca-Codo-Sindair
In Perb, the total economically feasible hydropower potential is 58.4GW, of which 78% is
located east of the Andes. Of these 45.3GW, over 50% is located below 1,000 meters above
sea level-deep in Amazonian forests. (Herrera Descalzi, 2009) PerO is no different from
Ecuador. A considerable number of protected areas are located in the Amazon region, east of
the Andes Mountains. (Fig. 32) This region is the site of the proposed plants for exclusive
export to Brazil; as discussed earlier in this chapter, the Inambari project will affect the buffer
zone of Buffer zone of the Bahuaja-Sonene National park. The Pakitzapango project overlaps
with the Otishi National Park and will flood or affect territories held by at least 10 different
communities in the Ash ninka Comunal Reserve: Potsoteni, Saniveni, Centor Tsomaveni,
Shimpenshariato, Meteni, Quiteha, Cutivireni, Camantavishi, Quempiri and Quimaropitari.
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Figure 32. PerO's System of Natural Protected Areas. From MINAM, 201 2.
N
In Chile, the X and XI regions, Los Lagos and Aysen, contain close to 56% of total hydropower
potential. Though some of these prospective projects have already been tapped, 95% of the
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total 15GW economically feasible potential in these two regions remains available for
development. (2001 data from Endesa, cited in Kausel, 2012) Both of these regions contain
the largest number of hectares specially designated for conservation: 35.4% of total. (Table 5)
While plans for HA's transmission line have not been finalized, it is expected they will
unavoidably cut through some of these protected areas.
Table 6. Regional Distribution of Protected Areas in Chile (hectares). From MMA, 2011 b.
Region TOTAL Percent
Arica y Parinacota 377,029 2.48%
Tarapac6 404,379 2.66%
Antofagasta 364,224 2.39%
Antofagasta/Atacama 43,691 0.29%
Atacama 112,822 0.74%
Coquimbo 17,166 0.11%
Coquimbo/Regi6n de Atacama 838 0.01%
Valparaiso* 49,640 0.33%
Metropolitana de Santiago 98,333 0.65%
Bernardo O'Higgins 40,066 0.26%
Bernardo O'Higgins/Regi6n del Maule 18,508 0.12%
Maule 24,543 0.16%
Biobio 149,110 0.98%
Araucania 294,409 1.94%
Los Rfos 22,329 0.15%
Los Lagos 1,103,539 7.26%
Aysen 4,255,801 27.98%
Magallanes y de la Antartica Chilena 7,832,979 51.50%
Total 15,209,406 100%
*Numbers for Valparafso exclude the Pascua Island Conservation Areas (15,000,000 has.)
All three countries have solved potential territorial contests between hydropower projects
and areas for environmental conservation with some form of high-level governmental
intervention. As discussed in Chapter 2, Rafael Correa issued Executive Decree 655, a special
decree that effectively gives carte blanche to large-scale energy projects regardless of
location, including CCS, for reasons of national security. In PerO and Chile, debates about the
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proposed hydropower projects have escalated past the standard institutional venues for
environmental review (the MINAM and MINEM in PerO and the COREMA and SEIA in Chile).
While Pero's projects are currently stalled, Chile's HA required the intervention of the
Supreme Court to make it past the first round of reviews. As the Universidad de Chile's Luis
Cordero, as well as representatives from HidroAysen S.A. pointed out in recent interviews
(interviewee no. 18), the Chilean courts include experts in legal matters who are nonetheless
ill-suited for highly technical environmental impact questions.
Potential impacts on indigenous territories presents an even bigger challenge, due to the
long-history of conflict between these communities and the state. Historically, following
independence from Spain and Portugal, Ecuador, Pero, and Chile, as well as other countries in
the region, have subjected indigenous populations in their countries to discrimination and
social exclusion. In the late XIX and for most of the XX century, governments in the region
practiced 'homogeneity' policies that sought to incorporate indigenous peoples into the
nation-state, often without observance to their history, traditional knowledge, languages, etc.
However, starting in the late 1960s, indigenous peoples throughout the region took a much
more active political position and organized as communities and nationalities. Their agenda
sought, first and foremost, to achieve full recognition of their rights as peoples and pre-
existent communities and to protect and maintain their ancestral livelihoods. Critically, they
also fought for a more active participation in national democratic. Overtime, this agenda was
helped in large part by the drafting of the International Labour Organization's (ILO)
Convention No. 169 in 1989.
ILO 169 is a landmark event in the political history of indigenous communities, for it created
an internationally recognized legal mechanism on which to support their political claims.
Some of the key dispositions include:
- Indigenous peoples have the right to enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental
freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. (Art. 3)
- The Convention also guarantees enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship without
discrimination. (Art. 4)
124
The Role of the State in Large-Scale Hydropower Development
* The spirit of consultation and participation constitutes the cornerstone of Convention No. 169 on
which all its provisions are based. The Convention requires that indigenous and tribal peoples are
consulted on issues that affect them. It also requires that these peoples are able to engage in free,
prior and informed participation in policy and development processes that affect them. (Art. 6)
* Indigenous and tribal peoples have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they
occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control over their economic, social and cultural
development. (Art. 7) (ILO, 2012)
The principles of consultation and participation in the Convention relate "not only to specific
development projects, but also to broader questions of governance, and the participation of
indigenous and tribal peoples in public life." (ILO, 2012)
In recent years, international legislative protection of indigenous rights has gained
momentum and directly informed constitutional changes across Latin America. Principles
such as self-determination, free prior informed consent, restitution of indigenous territories
and lands, and intellectual property rights and protections, are all hotly debated topics that
now feature prominently in relevant regulatory and international agreements, such as the
United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Ecuador, PerO, and Chile have ratified ILO 169. However, domestic legislation has not
developed in harmony. Norms and regulations governing indigenous peoples are often
inconsistent with priority legal projects, such as mining and oil policies. Notably, conflicts
arise between legislation governing indigenous populations and environmental conservation
areas-territorial categories that also display considerable overlap with each other.
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Table 7. Status of ratification of ILO 169 in South America. From ILO, 2012.
Country Ratified ILO 169 Year
Argentina Yes
J.
Bolivia Yes
Brasil Yes
Chile Yes
Colombia Yes
Ecuador Yes
Mexico Yes
Paraguay Yes
Perd Yes
Uruguay No
Venezuela Yes
2000
1991
2002
2008
1991
1998
1990
1993
1994
2002
Ecuador, PerO, and Chile all recognize some form of community-based territorial ownership,
yet none of these countries have a clearly-defined regime for communal territories. While
Ecuador and Pero have granted collective titles to many communities in their countries, there
is no special legal figure capable of protecting these territories indefinitely as a collective
property. In the late XIX century, Chile assigned (and effectively fragmented) segments of the
Mapuche population to a quasi-reservation property unit, the reducci6n. Given that both
mining and energy generation resources coincide with a large portion of these lands, both
the government and private companies continuously found ways to encroach on ancestral
indigenous territories. (Aylwin, 2002)
Ecuador has not faced conflicts with indigenous communities throughout the development
of CCS. As described in Chapter 2, the dam site circumvents the main road from Lago Agrio to
Quito, and thus coincides either with newly 'colonized' towns or with unpopulated areas.
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Nonetheless, as noted, consultation with affected communities in the site's buffer zone has
been insufficient. In PerG, Inambari presents a similar case: there are no significant indigenous
communities near the site. This did not prevent communities near the site from actively
opposing the project, both as part of formal dialogues with the project sponsors as well as
through public protests-a factor that surely influenced the MINEM in its decision to revoke
the project's temporary license. However, Pakitzapango will put the country's regulatory and
institutional capacities to the test. The Ashaninka communities have traditionally suffered
from either complete lack of state presence or for violent interventions, especially during the
years when the terrorist group Shining Path fought government militias on Ashaninka lands,
leaving thousands of casualties behind. (Nelsen, 2012)
Compared to Ecuador and PerO, Chile is the least progressive with respect to indigenous
peoples (4.6% of total population, according to official figures from 2002; over 80% of these
communities self-identify as Mapuche. Relevant domestic law includes the Ley 19.253 (1993),
which protects "ethnic groups" but, unlike legislation in Pero and Ecuador, does not
recognize indigenous peoples, a status that would otherwise grant considerably ampler
community-based rights to the Mapuche and other communities. Chile ratified the ILO 169 in
2008 and subsequently applied its norms to protect indigenous water rights on a 2009
landmark case-an important development in the governance of indigenous territories. (The
Santiago Times, 2009) However, the country lacks sufficient processes to observe the ILO
169's mandate; the EIA process, which involves the COREMA or CONAMA, as well as the SEIA,
is practically mechanism to evaluate observance of indigenous rights. Infrastructure projects
often require individual negotiations with a handful of families or affected household, further
increasing fragmentation of the Mapuche and other communities. Moreover, while Chile
recognizes the need for consultation, it lacks secondary regulation to govern and determine
how and when it should happen (as discussed in Chapter 2, Ecuador faces a similar problem).
In light of these territorial contests, the main question for the future development of
hydropower is whether the state will create processes for deliberation whenever energy and
conservation interests collide. It is unreasonable to expect complete harmony across
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environmental, indigenous, and extractive industry legislation, which results in an urgent
need to define clear procedures for negotiation with affected communities and stakeholder,
near as well as outside the potential hydropower sites.
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Conclusion.
Shaping the Debate on Hydropower and Sustainable Energy in South
America
This thesis presented the cases of three large hydropower projects that show the ways in
which the governments of Ecuador, Pero, and Chile currently encounter and resolve the
energy trilemma. These states face a great challenge: to improve livelihoods for every citizen,
to find and implement energy technology solutions to climate change and environmental
degradation, and to ensure the security of power supplies. We can expect large hydropower
to play important role in these countries' future electricity portfolios, especially as they seek
to satisfy baseload energy requirements. However, given opposition from civil society
organizations, local communities, and subnational governments, the state in each country
has no choice but to reconsider the ways in which it decides why, how, and for whom it
develops its energy generation capacity.
The three hydropower megaprojects discussed above-Ecuador's Coca-Codo-Sinclair, Pero's
Inambari, and Chile's HidroAysen-have each emerged as an emblematic answer to the
trilemma. However, these projects are immersed in constant social and environmental unrest.
Relying on evidence from Ecuador's case, and using information from Pero and Chile, this
thesis argues that these conflicts occur in the context of three main regional trends. First,
large hydropower projects are insufficiently evaluated against a large portfolio of energy
generation options. Rather, in a political and economy history that can be traced to the early
1970s, this type of projects experience a number of key design iterations in order to meet
ever-changing goals with respect to flood areas, maximum installed capacity, and power-
production capacity, needed to meet not just reliability and security goals (e.g., Ecuador's
12% power reserve margins) but also the return on investment for project sponsors (e.g. HA,
in light of the projected expenses associated with the transmission portion of the project). In
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other words, the universe of alternatives is limited to the possible iterations of a single
projects, making projects like CCS, Inambari, and HA all but inevitable as soon as the right
political conditions arise. The universe of alternatives for electricity generation depends
largely the availability of local sources of primary energy and the cost of technologies
necessary to produce electricity. Chile has few indigenous sources and investors in Ecuador
and Peru do not yet find enough economic incentives to deploy utility-scale, costlier
renewables beyond small hydro, small wind and biomass projects, as is evident from the most
recent, 2011 round of auctions for renewable capacity ($66-80/MWh for wind projects versus
Inambari's $80/MWh). However, the large hydropower projects discussed in this work are
viable not simply because they win out against costlier technologies, but rather because the
political sponsors that guide energy planning-ranging from the executive branch to
sectorial ministries-favor CCS, Inambari, and HA from the outset.
Second, the undeniable influence of bilateral partners such as Brazil and China in the
outcome of energy planning decisions has dramatically changed the rules of the
'development game.' Infrastructure for economic development, including energy generation
megaprojects such as CCS and Inambari, is being built with unprecedented speed, which puts
an additional pressure on national governments to balance the tradeoff between
development and its social and environmental impacts in the absence of harmonious,
universal safeguards and standards.
Third, South America as a region faces a considerable governance challenge. The resources on
which countries like Ecuador, PerO, and Chile rely on for its economic development, including
primary sources for electricity production, sit in some of the most biodiverse areas in the
world. Not coincidentally, these same areas are home to indigenous communities that have
been historically marginalized and discriminated, and whose livelihoods are at risk because of
the development of large hydropower projects. There will be no way for the case countries
discussed in this document to avoid conflict between competing goals. To secure local
electricity supplies or ensure a less carbon intense generation portfolio, the state will have to
intervene directly in those areas where interests and uses overlap. In other words, the state
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needs effective ways to share the costs and benefits of a collective good-cheaper, more
plentiful sources of electricity to power economic development-across groups who may not
agree with its objectives and justifications.
In terms of alternatives, the case of Ecuador illustrate how the state's vision for "energy
sovereignty"-single-handedly the most important justification for the construction of CCS-
informs and effectively hamstrings the universe of alternatives. Cost considerations are
important; it is difficult to deny that for a small emerging economy like Ecuador, non-
traditional renewables, such as solar and wind, may yet be prohibitively expensive. Moreover,
assuming precipitation allows for a somewhat predictable average annual riverflow of
approximately 200m 3/s-critics argue that drastic weather events will reduce the plant's
capacity factor to as low as 0.3, based on experiences with other large hydropower projects in
the country-CCS is among only a handful of cost-effective, potential projects for baseload
generation. Indeed, CONELEC estimates current average cost of energy in Ecuador at $6
cents/kWh; CCS' energy is expected to average $4 cents/kWh. However, when energy
authorities in the country call for reserve margins of 10-12% for its power capacity and energy
generation potential, it is worth asking the question of what the full cost of energy
sovereignty really is, and not just in terms of 'overnight costs'or other project-specific metrics.
In other words, against this type of goal and within the context of the 2009 electricity crisis,
CCS emerged as a single alternative deserving of special treatment. This exceptionalism
allowed the government to overlook existing environmental impact processes and create
unorthodox legal mechanisms for the procurement of financing and contractors, in this case a
consortium led by China's Sinohydro and financed by the Chinese Exim Bank. These special
measures translate into quantifiable costs for local governments and communities. As
evidenced in Chapter 2, the Ecuadorian government was clear about its priority with respect
to CCS-sovereignty and security-but was never transparent, in any of the official CCS
documents, about the real costs of its choice, which may become evident only post-facto.
Transparency about "priority" projects such as CCS is necessary in order to allow for a bigger
universe of alternatives.
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In contrast to the cases of Ecuador and Chile, Per6 can be viewed as an outlier. The country is
not considering large hydropower strictly for reasons of sovereignty and security of supply,
nor is it invoking an urgent need to fuel economic development. Plentiful reserves of natural
gas-which are heavily subsidized in domestic markets and thus allow thermal generation
technologies to'win' over alternatives-give the country wiggle room to meet projected
demand. PerG is considering dams like Inambari for the sake of regional energy market
integration with Brazil, and is thus testing the processes and norms, and even the political
good will of local actors, that govern energy planning in environmentally vulnerable regions
of the country, such as the Amazon region. In this context, the question about alternatives to
large hydropower is relevant only if the Peruvian state is first willing to answer what these
alternatives are for. Is it for integration? If that is the case, then the government still needs to
present a cogent cost-benefit analysis that proves that integration is a valuable political
decision. Only then can alternatives for integration be considered, and the full impacts of
Inambari, Pakitzapango, and other dams be weighed against potential options.
If, however, the alternatives are necessary to secure long-term supplies for domestic energy
consumption, then this will unavoidably lead to a difficult debate about the merits of a
generation portfolio that relies on a heavily subsidized fuel: natural gas. This need is especially
evident if projects like Inambari, as currently proposed, enter the Brazilian market at
approximately $80/MWh, which is considerable more expensive than gas-fired plants and,
unexpectedly, comparable to wind prices from Peru's most recent auctions ($66-87/MWh).
(MINEM - IADB, 2012) PerO already sources the majority of its power from hydroelectric
sources; to continue on this path, it will have to create regulatory incentives to curb reliance
in gas-fired plants, or simply face the risks of inelastic supply. Ollanta Humala's government
has argued that Peruvian gas should focus more on international exports and the production
of derivatives, and reduce its use for comparatively low value-add processes, such as
electricity generation. If supply and production cannot meet multiple economic objectives,
this shift spells trouble for generators who rely on cheap, plentiful domestic supply.
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Chile is in a comparatively more difficult position, since it does not have as many domestic
sources of primary energy as its neighbors. The challenge of security of supply is much more
palpable than it is in Ecuador or PerO. This is in large part because the country has a much
bigger and stronger economy, with comparatively more transparent and efficient processes
for democratic deliberation. This is a mixed blessing: there are loud voices arguing for costlier
alternatives-indeed as the CADE report shows, a majority of Chileans are willing to incur the
costs of non-traditional renewables-but there are equally strong institutions, including
state-owned mining companies like Codelco who drive much of the country's economic
output, that frame the debate in terms of cost-minimization and are thus less willing to
undertake the costs and intermittence risks of renewables. Still others like HA's Colbon are
calling for the Chilean state to assume the costs of a farther-reaching and more
accommodating power transmission network. According to some estimates (interviewees 18,
24), HA's transmission costs range from 40 to 60% of the project's total $10 billion, or more,
should overruns occur. In other words, as HA illustrates, all stakeholders are vying for a more
equitable distribution given that Chile has set an upper bound on the cost of economic
development.
Evidence from Ecuador, Chile, and Pera shows that large hydroelectric projects require special
regulatory interventions to move forward. Since the 1980s, the unbundling of generation,
transmission, and distribution, and the introduction of marginal pricing in electricity markets
resulted in a carbonization of generation sources in these and other countries. Simply put, the
risks associated with large hydropower-great upfront capital investments, construction
delays and cost overruns, overestimation of energy demand, social and environmental
conflicts, etc.-were too great compared to the potential gains from faster-to-build fossil-
fired plants. While over the last decade governments like Rafael Correa's in Ecuador have
regained a prominent position in the development of large hydropower, they have not
succeeded in reducing its risks. Regulatory fixes for social and environmental conflicts-of
which many occur outside of formal political processes or platforms-are the result of
continuous iterations to megaprojects. In other words, controversial projects are proposed
and implemented, which result in conflicts that catalyze new regulation; a prime example is
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Chile's new renewable energy law 20/20, which has excluded large hydropower from the
portfolio of 'clean' alternatives for Chile. At worst, litigation and high-level judicial
intervention is the only way to legitimize arguments for and against large hydropower. From
the perspective of electricity and environmental planning, this is a remarkably inefficient
process for policy innovation. As a sign of democratic participation, this "decide-announce-
defend" model of decision-making pits government branches against one another while
practically guaranteeing publicly visible, extra-official mobilization to oppose electricity
generation projects.
With respect to the new sources of financing, one can analyze south-south development
ventures through the lens of international trade and economic relations. Bilateral partners
look for ways to harmonize standards for issues like environmental and labor law whenever
these are unequal across countries. Countries may appeal to international treaties and
agreements, but in south-south development ventures, the reality is that international
safeguards can scarcely keep up with the speed of energy megaproject development. Thus, it
is imperative to complement international standards with alternative methods for
accountability.
In the case of Ecuador and PerG, we can be very specific and note that the agenda toward
better development practices begins with two actors: Brazil and China. As discussed in
Chapter 3, these countries have become the most important funders and builders of large
dams throughout the world, as well as within their own borders. In recent, the Chinese
government has shown a greater commitment to better safeguards for hydropower
development within tis borders, to the point that it has tacitly accepted past mistakes with
regard to gargantuan projects such as the Three Gorges Dam. However, it is unreasonable to
expect the country to compromise economic growth and change the way it carries out
hydropower development elsewhere. Similarly, Brazil faces huge challenges with hydropower
development inside its borders, especially in the Amazon region. Political opposition since
the late 1970s has resulted in comparatively more progressive and stricter environmental and
social impact regulations for electricity projects than those in Ecuador and PerG. However, the
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staggering rise of Brazil's economy over the last few years also makes it unlikely that the
country compromise on the way the country enacts its infrastructure-led development
agenda.
While Ecuador and Per should uphold Chinese and Brazilian partners to at least as strict
regulations as they have enacted in their home country, this will not be enough to avoid the
risks of south-south development ventures. It will be up to the national governments to play
the role of double mediator: first, it will have to'walk the talk' of sovereignty and confront
geopolitical partners whenever their operations results in unacceptable impacts, such as the
displacement of the Ashaninka communities near Pakitzapango for the sake of profits from
the export of electricity to Brazil. Second, it will have to resolve conflicts with local
governments, the sites where south-south development ventures actually play out. Put
differently, the governments and communities of Napo in Ecuador and Cusco, Madre de Dios,
and Puno in Pero, and others like it, will continuously challenge the national government's
unilateral notion of sovereignty and integration. In other words, the state will have to enact
better distribution of costs and benefits not just within its borders, but also with its bilateral
partners.
Mediation with local actors is also at the heart of the problem of territorial contestation.
There is no way for Ecuador, PerG, and Chile to avoid the fight over resources that is already
taking place in some of the most environmentally and socially vulnerable regions of the
continent-the Amazon region and Chile's Patagonia. Competing interests over these areas'
future will be the ultimate test for these countries' democratic processes. First and foremost,
the state needs to justify, and quantify the full costs and externalities of, its preferred choice
for future energy generation. This undoubtedly calls for the settling of conflicting view on
whom and why will absorb the externalities of hydropower development. In recent months,
large number of indigenous communities in both Ecuador and Per6 marched from these
countries' provinces to the capitals, Quito and Lima, to show dissatisfaction with the way the
state governs and allocated the costs and benefits of water use. As part of these protests,
communities raised important questions about the countries' development agendas, which
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heavily rely on 'nationalist' control and extraction of resource. Similarly, in Chile, almost every
expert interviewed for this thesis expressed surprise and bafflement at the level of public
participation in protests for and against HidroAysen, couched in a larger debate about the
country's future economic prospects (interviewees no. 8, 24, 25, 31, 33). This, again points to
the need for a better distribution of costs and benefits.
Is the state the only institution capable of managing this distribution? The three case studies
discussed in this work exist along a continuum of state involvement in the hydropower
debates. On one end, the Ecuadorian government has re-centralized energy planning and
taken a top-down approach to decisions about energy planning. It has determined priority
projects for development, such as CCS, and enabled regulatory mechanisms to ensure their
development, to the detriment of existing procurement, territorial planning, and
environmental regulation. Thus, the state is actively pushing the limits of its executive
capacity to internalize and provide solutions to conflicts among affected stakeholders near
CCS. PerO, in light of the plans for Inambari, is somewhere in the middle: the Executive power
and its ministers have carried out an integration agreement and are now testing its potential
implementation 'on the ground;' local opposition has, for now, stalled the project. In this
sense, PerO illustrates how, as currently designed, post-facto hydropower assessment
procedures fail to achieve consensus early on and will continue to prevent new
developments. At the other end, we find Chile, historically a very liberal country where the
state has no stake in the energy sector beyond that of regulatory and technical oversight. The
litigation about HA has unexpectedly unified critics and supporters of the plant on a call for a
more active government capable of internalizing conflict and risk associated with energy
megaprojects, particularly upgrades to the country's transmission network.
There are alternative means to legitimize and reach wider consensus around hydropower
projects before development begins. A possible model is to expand on the capabilities of
independent, technical institutions at a regional level. Domestically, independent regulators
and operators are currently beholden to the Executive branch. In Ecuador, both CONELEC and
CENACE respond to the political authority of the Executive branch. These agencies have
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especially limited powers when overseeing "strategic projects" that take precedence over
other requirements, such as an a priori analysis of generation alternatives. Pero's
OSINERGMIN, the country's Energy Regulatory Commission, is likewise limited as a purely
independent agency; it was created to allow the Peruvian state to carry out direct supervision
over energy, mining, and electricity operations. MINAM, the highest environmental authority
in the country, does not develop or review project-specific ElAs. MINEM and other ministries
must ensure compliance with social and environmental safeguards, while simultaneously
acting as project sponsors, which often leads to predictable tradeoffs between projected
economic gains and social and environmental impacts. Because of Chile's market-based
regulatory structure, both the National Energy Commission (CNE) and the Superintendence
for Electricity and Fuels (SEC), respond to the Ministry of Energy and limit their role to the
design and monitoring of market rules and technical standards for participation. Current
regulation in these three countries does not empower system operators or energy
commissions to arbitrate or catalyze consensus about the political and economic benefits of
hydro projects.
Third-party monitoring and arbitration of hydropower development may help overcome
operational and executive constraints at the national level. Energy authorities in the region
are actively pursuing opportunities for regional cooperation, especially with regard to
supranational power sector integration. International energy trade can bring gains through
regional economic dispatch and shared reserve margins. However, in the absence of clear
supranational rules, it can also lead to an 'outsourcing' of externalities and impacts, as
evidenced by the regional integration agreement between Brazil and Pero that led to the
resurgence of Inambari and Pakitzapango. This experience shows that political conditions are
favorable for regional cooperation.
It is necessary to move beyond ministerial cooperation and ensure the participation of actors
that are not directly associated with incumbent governments or project sponsors, such as the
Ashaninko peoples in Pero, as well as neutral experts. International water agreements such as
the Indus Water Treaty (1960) provide a model for cooperation where permanent oversight
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bodies produce and share knowledge on high-impact projects and rely on third-party
mediators to help resolve water allocation disputes. The Central American Electrical
Interconnection System (SIEPAC, in Spanish) offers another instance of supranational
cooperation in which a basic set of standards and rules govern activities in the energy sector
(regional trade of electricity, in this particular example). The IADB, which bankrolled a
substantial portion of the project, called for international experts to advise each country in
the transition toward an unbundled, market-based regional power network.
Independent third-party arbitration and mediation does not rule out or replace the protocol
currently being developed by the IHA and the HSAF, which, in any case, fails to confer any
rights to dam-affected people. (Bosshard, 2010) When and if large hydropower and other
energy projects result in social and environmental conflicts, a regional oversight entity may
provide a more effective, official alternative for evaluation and consensus-building than the
courts or non-enforceable protocols, whether local or international. This mechanism does not
obviate the need for national governments to refine the procedures governing hydropower
as well as energy and territorial planning. However, it creates a platform, specific to the
region, capable of verifying that procedural requirements are properly designed and
implemented. This type of approach represents but one opportunity to better identify and
facilitate the development of the lowest-impact, most cost-effective hydropower projects in
South America.
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